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EVIDENCE - THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND THE MARKETPLACE 
OF IDEAS: ADVOCATING FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF THE NECES­
SITY DEFENSE FOR SOME OF THE BAY STATE'S CIVILLY 
DISOBEDIENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Eighty-three year old Frances Crowe stood in the road outside 
Westover Air Force Base dressed in traditional Iraqi attire.! In her 
hands she held a sign.2 "PLEASE DO NOT BOMB ME," it said.3 
Crowe's aim, on this January 2003 morning, was to persuade 
the military personnel arriving at the base not to participate in the 
impending invasion of Iraq.4 Like the other eight activists soon to 
be arrested,S Crowe was acutely aware of the ongoing humanitarian 
crisis in Iraq6 and regarded the fast-approaching "preemptive war"7 
1. Affidavit of Frances H. Crowe in Defendants' Motion to Exercise a Defense of 
Necessity, Commonwealth v. Crowe (Chicopee Dist. Ct. 2003) (No. 0320CR 000 135) 




5. The other "Eight at the Gate" were Andrea Avayzian, Lori Blanding, Carl 
Doerner, Jean Grossholtz, Peter Kakos, Claudia Lefko, Kathleen Wentworth, and Pa­
tricia Wieland. Posting of Carl Doerner, cdoerner@surfglobal.net, to AriseAction@ 
yahoogroups.com (Apr. 26, 2003) (copy on file with author). By the time of their ac­
tion, over 1,800 people in the United States had been arrested in protests against the 
buildup to the invasion of Iraq. See William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil 
Disobedience Cases: Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 3, 3 n.l (2003) (citing Jack 
Cohen-Joppa & Felice Cohen-Joppa, Resistance Reflections: Resistance 2002, THE Nu­
CLEAR RESISTER, Apr. 24, 2003, at 2). 
6. In 1999, a Congressional delegation to Iraq reported that 
the image of emaciated babies and malnourished young children ill or even 
dying in Iraq is by now well-known is the U.S. The staff delegation, visiting 
hospitals in Baghdad, Amara, and Basra, found that reality unchanged, with 
most of these children dying from treatable diseases, usually the result of un­
clean water and exacerbated by malnutrition, for which basic medications and 
treatments are unavailable. 
PHYLLIS BENNIS, UNDERSTANDING THE U.S.-IRAQ CRISIS: A PRIMER 20 (2003). De­
fendants Lefko and Winkworth observed "the human reality behind agency statistics," 
Affidavit of Claudia Lefko in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1, when the two went to 
Iraq in January 2001, as participants "in a humanitarian investigation of the effects of 
sanctions." Affidavit of Kathleen Winkworth in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1. See 
also Joy Gordon, When Intent Makes All the Difference in the World: Economic Sanc­
tions on Iraq and the Accusation of Genocide,S YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 57, 58 
(2002) (examining "the fairly provocative claim (made by former U.N. Humanitarian 
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as an imminent danger.8 For the previous twelve years, she had 
advocated on behalf of Iraqi civilians by petitioning her representa­
tives in Congress, writing letters to newspaper editors, showing 
films, participating in marches and vigils, and giving public ad­
dresses.9 In short, Crowe believed she had fulfilled the Gandhian 
prerequisite to civil disobedience1o by exhausting all legal 
alternatives.! 1 
Perhaps most important, Crowe had a reasonable expectation 
in the power of civil disobedience to alter the course of a soldier's 
lifeP Thirty years before, on International Women's Day, Crowe 
went to this same Westover road "dressed as a Vietnamese wo­
man."13 That day, she touched the conscience of Lt. Donald Daw­
son, an Air Force B-52 Bomber pilot, who, shortly after 
encountering Crowe, concluded he could no longer fly his regular 
bombing missions over Vietnam and Cambodia.14 
This time, Crowe was arrested and charged with disturbing the 
peace.IS Prior to her trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in 
Coordinator Denis Halliday, among others) that the systematic, highly planned imposi­
tion of a policy with such devastating effects can rightly be termed genocide"). 
7. See Ellen Goodman, Bush's Fear of Fear Itself, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 
2002, at A19, available at 2002 WL 4153492 (examining the President's "justification for 
preemptive war against Iraq"). 
8. Defendants' Motion, supra note 1, at 1. 
9. Affidavit of Frances H. Crowe in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1. 
10. Civil disobedience is used here to describe (1) intentional, (2) illegal, (3) acts 
of protest, (4) conducted openly and (5) non-violently (6) by actors willing to risk pun­
ishment. See infra Part I.B. 
11. Affidavit of Frances H. Crowe in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1, at 1-2; 
see also M. K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 4 (Bharatan Kumarappa ed., 1961) 
("Civil Disobedience presupposes the habit of willing obedience to laws without fear of 
their sanctions. It can, therefore, be practiced only as a last resort ...."). 
12. Affidavit of Frances H. Crowe in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
For an enlightening account of the impact of wars on those who survive them, see Dan 
Baum, The Price of Valor, THE NEW YORKER, July 12 & 19, 2004, at 48-49 (docu­
menting the long-lasting psychological impact of turning "soldiers, momentarily, into 
reflexive, robotic killers"). 
13. Affidavit of Frances H. Crowe in Defendants' Motion, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
14. Id. at 3. 
15. Commonwealth's Motion Opposing the Presentation of a Necessity Defense 
at 1, Commonwealth v. Crowe (Chicopee Dist. Ct. 2003) (No. 03-0132-35, 39, 40) [here­
inafter Commonwealth's Motion]. "[D]isturbers of the peace ... may be punished by 
imprisonment ... for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than two 
hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 
272, § 53 (2004). According to two commentators, the elements of this offense are "(i) 
Actions, conduct, or utterances (ii) In or near a public place (iii) Which are unreasona­
bly disruptive and (iv) Infringe the right of at least one person to be undisturbed." 
Howard J. Alperin & Lawrence D. Shubow, Disturbing the Peace, 14A MASS. PRAC. 
2005] THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 301 
limine16 asking the court to prevent Crowe and her fellow pro se 
defendants from asserting a necessity defenseY On April 25, 2003, 
the court applied the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Hood18 and orally granted the prosecution's motion,19 thereby 
prohibiting the Crowe defendants from situating their conduct in its 
social context.20 
This Note addresses the issue of whether the Hood holding­
affirmed in Commonwealth v. Brogan21 and applied in Crowe­
permitting the use of "broad" motions in limine,22 undermines an 
avowed First Amendment purpose by depriving the marketplace of 
ideas.23 This Note contends that such motions do often compro­
§ 9.337 (3d ed. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 269 N.E.2d 657, 659-60 (Mass. 
1971); Commonwealth v. Orlando, 359 N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (Mass. 1977)). 
16. Commonwealth's Motion, supra note 15, at 1. In Commonwealth v. Hood, 
452 N.E.2d 188, 196 (Mass. 1983), the court characterized the motion in limine as a 
procedural tool used to bar the introduction of prejudicial evidence. See infra Part II.B. 
17. The necessity defense is intended for those "rare and extraordinary circum­
stances" when illegal conduct "promotes some value higher than the value of literal 
compliance with the law." Debbie A. Levin, Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of 
Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. ON. L. REV. 501, 503 (1979) (citation 
omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Garuti, 504 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) 
(distinguishing between the justification of necessity, which "one pleads when circum­
stances force one to perform a criminal act," and duress, which "applies when human 
beings force one to act"). See generally infra Part II.A. 
18. The Hood court held that since the necessity defense was "inapplicable to the 
defendants' actions, they were not prejudiced by their inability to present their evidence 
to the jury." Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 197. For a full discussion of Hood, see Part III.C. 
19. As of January 31, 2005, the court had not provided the defendants with a 
written opinion. 
20. Doerner, supra note 5. According to Doerner, the defendants had hoped to 
juxtapose the impact of their illegal conduct-"preventing several dozen people from 
getting to work on time"-with "sanctions our government acknowledges killed 500,000 
Iraqi children." Id. at 2. 
21. 612 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. 1983). In Brogan, the defendant failed to overcome 
his initial burden of demonstrating that the harm of his crime was, "as a matter of policy 
... significantly exceeded by the harm that would have resulted if the defendant had 
not violated the law." Id. at 659. Accordingly, the court concluded there was no need to 
analyze the defendant's conduct in light of the four elements articulated in Hood. Id. at 
660 n.lO. 
22. Broad motions in limine are relatively new and differ from the more tradi­
tional ones in that they have been used "to 'knock out' the entirety of the evidence 
supporting a defense before it can be heard by the jury." Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 
439 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
23. Although the concept of a marketplace of ideas was first articulated by Justice 
Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market"), the exact phrase did not surface in a Supreme Court 
opinion until Justice Brennan's concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 
301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It 
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mise this free speech objective24 and proposes that courts refuse 
these prosecutorial requests in certain prescribed cases. 
At the core of this proposal is an appreciation for the contribu­
tion civil disobedience has made in broadening the scope of politi­
cal discourse. After exploring the concept of a "marketplace of 
ideas," Part I of this Note provides a brief history of this contribu­
tion in Massachusetts. Part II then addresses the origins of the ne­
cessity doctrine and in limine practice. In Part III, this Note 
discusses the evolution of these areas in Commonwealth jurispru­
dence by examining three principal cases. Part IV explores the crit­
icism such cases have engendered. It suggests that while treatments 
of Crowe-like outcomes are often quite insightful, the solutions 
they proffer frequently overlook the vulnerability of human beings 
who have been, and will continue to be, the "objects" of "crimes of 
conscience." In offering a new approach to assertions of necessity 
in cases of civil disobedience, Part V seeks to balance the concerns 
of egalitarians and civil libertarians. This Note concludes by urging 
advocates, courts, and scholars to continue the search for creative 
and just solutions each time the commitment to promote liberty 
conflicts with the quest to eliminate inequality. 
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.") (emphasis 
added). A focus upon the manner in which these motions impact the public's access to 
information does not mean other First Amendment objectives are not similarly compro­
mised. See Barbara J. Katz, Note, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 32 
UCLA L. REv. 904,913-19 (1985) (discussing other Free Speech purposes served by 
allowing the civilly disobedient to present evidence of necessity). Nor is free expression 
the lone constitutional casualty. For a compelling account of how broad motions in 
limine run afoul of Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments, as well the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury, see Doug­
las L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the 
Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (1987). 
24. Because "most of the law of evidence ... involve[s] legal control of speech 
lying well beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment's concern," this Note refrains 
from subjecting in limine rulings to "the [higher] burden of justification imposed by the 
First Amendment." Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Pre­
liminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1765 (2004). 
For an interesting discussion of "this lack of First Amendment coverage," see id. ("The 
explanation ... lies not in a theory of free speech or in legal doctrine, but instead in an 
often serendipitous array of political, cultural, and economic factors determining what 
makes the First Amendment salient in some instances of speech regulation but not in 
others."). See also Richard Delgado, Are Hate Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A 
Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 870-71 (1998) (discussing the various 
"'exceptions' and special doctrines that riddle free speech law-libel, defamation ... , 
words of threat and of monopoly, state secrets, copyright, plagiarism, disrespectful 
speech uttered to a judge or other authority figure," etc.). 
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I. DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 
A. The First Amendment and the Marketplace of Ideas 
1. Definition 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro­
hibits Congress from abridging the freedom of expression.25 "[T]he 
purpose of the First Amendment," the Court stated in an oft­
quoted phrase from Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C.,26 is "to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ul­
timately prevail ...."27 This idea that "competition will correct 
pernicious ideas ... as the invisible hand of the ideas market ... 
guides the truth to victory"28 serves as the cornerstone of tradi­
tional marketplace theory. With the triumph of truth, its adherents 
contend, will come remedies for social ills and the suitable advance­
ment of society.29 
2. Origins 
Although the concept of a marketplace of ideas was first cham­
pioned by John Milton in the seventeenth century,3° it remained an 
unarticulated "theory of our Constitution" until Justice Oliver Wen­
dell Holmes suggested that 
[w]hen men [sic] have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de­
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried OUt.31 
25. Together, the freedoms of speech and press are often referred to as the free­
dom of expression. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 n.3 (1984). 
26. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
27. Id. at 390 (emphasis added). For a recent example of how the Red Lion 
Broadcasting holding has been utilized, see McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
28. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. 
REv. 951, 957 (1997). 
29. Ingber, supra note 25, at 3. 
30. Id. at 3 n.8 (citing J. Milton, Areopagitica (London 1644), in 2 COMPLETE 
PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 486 (E. Sirluck ed., 1959» ("[T]hough all the windes 
of doctrin were let loose to play upon earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously 
by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falshood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter."). 
31. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Holmes' invocation of the marketplace came in United States v. 
Abrams, where the majority upheld the convictions of five defend­
ants under the Espionage Act for their authorship and/or distribu­
tion of two leaflets critical of the United States' intervention in the 
Russian Revolution.32 Eight months earlier, in March of 1919, 
Schenck v. United States,33 Frohwefk v. United States ,34 and Debs v. 
United States35 had affirmed the convictions of various political dis­
sidents who opposed the United States' intervention in World War 
J.36 Because Holmes had written for the Court in these three cases, 
his Abrams dissent sparked instant and sustained scrutiny.37 
Not surprisingly, scholarly efforts to explain Holmes' embrace 
32. Seven individuals had been indicted for writing and distributing two leaflets, 
which had been dumped onto the streets of New York City from rooftops throughout 
lower Manhattan. Vincent Blasi, Misleading Metaphor: Holmes and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 4-5, available at http://www.law.berkeley.eduicenprolkadishIBlasi%20Holmes. 
pdf (citing RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE Su­
PREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1984» (last visited July 17, 2004). One defendant 
was acquitted and another died while in custody the night before the trial. Id. at 8-10. 
For other details of the case, see id. at 3-12. 
33. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). According to Justice Holmes, 
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic .... The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. 
Id. at 52 (citations omitted). For a critique of the "clear and present danger test," see 
John M. Sier, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 42 THE GUILD PRACT!­
CIONER 18,21 (1985) (claiming the test "protects only random mutterings and emascu­
lated speech which either is not intended to incite or is expressed by an unthreatening 
or impotent individual"). 
34. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). See id. at 206 (holding that "a person may be convicted of 
a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion"). 
35. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). See id. at 214 (affirming the conviction of the famous 
Socialist Eugene V. Debs who told listeners that, "you need to know that you are fit for 
something better than slavery and cannon fodder"). For a thought-provoking critique 
of the defendant's war opposition, see Kathleen Kennedy, Manhood and Subversion 
During World War I: The Cases of Eugene Debs and Alexander Berkman, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1661, 1689-91 (2004). 
36. According to Brooklyn Law School Professor Nan D. Hunter, "First Amend­
ment jurisprudence has never fully comprehended the role that group identity dynamics 
played [in the 1919 speech cases] but has rather treated [them] as emerging from dis­
connected, atomistic encounters between a repressive state and dissenting individuals." 
Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy 
and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1672 (2000). This failure to recognize that "our 
most cherished doctrinal charter of individual liberty in fact grew from group action 
intended to assert a claim of what was undeniably group rights" id. at 1715, has reper­
cussions in the clash between equality and expression-a topic this Note will explore in 
greater depth in Parts IV and V. 
37. See Blasi, supra note 32, at 17 ("Generations of law students have begun their 
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of the marketplace have been inconclusive. Prominent among the 
many theories are those claiming: Holmes was a staunch defender 
of free expression all along and only wrote the March opinions to 
inject standards that might later serve as safeguards for dissent;38 
Holmes evolved as a result of his correspondence with Federal Dis­
trict Judge Learned Hand;39 Holmes feared losing the admiration of 
young progressives;40 Holmes changed course in the wake of criti­
cism from Zechariah Chafee, Jr.;41 Holmes was chastened by Ernst 
Freund's critique of his Debs decision;42 Holmes finally came to ac­
cept a concept he first encountered in "The Metaphysical Club,"43 
and; Holmes was disgusted by the "ugly mob psychology that 
emerged at the height of the Red Scare during the summer of 
1919."44 
study of the First Amendment by seeking to understand the Holmes opinions in these 
1919 cases ...."). 
38. Id. at 16-17. 
39. Id. (citing Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN L. REV. 719 (1975)). 
40. Id. (citing EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE 
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 772 (1962); G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the 
Modernization ofFree Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 
391,410-11,419-33,441 (1992)). 
41. David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 97, 98 (1982) (citing Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and The Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The 
First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971)); see also Steven J. Heyman, Righting the 
Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 1275, 1302 (1998) (repeating Chafee's argument that "the most important pur­
pose served by free speech was the social interest in 'the discovery and spread of truth 
on subjects of general concern' "). 
42. Bogen, supra note 41, at 98-99 (citations omitted). 
43. G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurispru­
dence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 897-902 n.178 (2002) 
(claiming the source of Holmes' marketplace analogy was Charles S. Pierce). See also 
WILLIAM JAMES, WRITINGS 1878-1899, at 450 (1992). Writing in what he dubbed an 
"age of toleration," James observed that 
no scientist will ever try actively to interfere with our religious faith, provided 
we enjoy it quietly with our friends and do not make a public nuisance of it in 
the market-place. But it is just on this matter of the market-place that I think 
the utility of such essays as mine may tum. If religious hypotheses about the 
universe be in order at all, then the active faiths of individuals in them, freely 
expressing themselves in life, are the experimental tests by which they are ver­
ified, and the only means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought 
out. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
44. Blasi, supra note 32, at 17 (Blasi's own explanation). 
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3. Evolution 
According to Professor Stanley Ingber, once the marketplace 
doctrine became an accepted tenet of constitutional law, its useful­
ness expanded beyond "the search for truth and knowledge" and 
"came to be perceived by courts and scholars as essential to effec­
tive popular participation in government."45 Equating an uninhib­
ited marketplace with an informed citizenry, some courts began to 
offer speech protection based on its perceived impact "on the audi­
ence rather than the speaker. "46 These two views of speech-as a 
means to a desirable end and a value unto itself-help explain both 
the enshrinement of the marketplace of ideas in United States juris­
prudence and the freedom of expression's preferred status within 
our constitutional scheme.47 
B. Civil Disobedience in the Commonwealth 
1. Definition 
Definitions of civil disobedience are as diverse as those who 
45. Ingber, supra note 25, at 3. Some scholars, including Ingber, perceive the 
market as "strongly biased in favor of positions that support entrenched interests." Id. 
at 6 ("[T]he present marketplace simply fine-tunes differences among elites while 
defusing pressure for change and fostering a myth of personal autonomy essential to the 
continued popular acceptance of a governing system biased toward the status quo."). 
See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law 
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills? , 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
1258, 1286 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider] ("Elite 
groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own supe­
rior position."); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 
TuL. L. REv. 1563, 1567 (1994) (suggesting that truth's dependence on social context 
makes the market "a poor test of truth indeed"). For a critique of the current market­
place, see infra Part V.A.3. 
46. Ingber, supra note 25, at 4. For an example of one such court, see Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. F.ee, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969) (calling it "crucial" that the public 
"receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and exper­
iences"). Many commentators reject "[a] market view of the first amendment [which] 
transforms the Constitution into a document, the purpose of which is to protect an 
idea's right of access and right to compete in the marketplace, instead of a document 
designed to protect all persons' right to express the idea." Peter J. Hammer, Free 
Speech and the "Acid Bath": An Evaluation and Critique of Judge Richard Posner's 
Economic Interpretation of the First Amendment, 87 MICH. L. REv. 499, 522 (1988). 
47. Ingber, supra note 25, at 4. See also J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Plural­
ism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375,392 (ex­
plaining how the First Amendment has come "to occupy a special position in the 
pantheon of constitutionally protected liberties"); Hunter, supra note 36, at 1709 n.198. 
According to Hunter: "The Court first referred to the 'preferred place' of the First 
Amendment in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). It had earlier described the 
First Amendment as 'the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form 
of freedom.'" Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937». 
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engage in it.48 For purposes of this Note, the term's use will be 
confined to: (1) intentional, (2) illegal, (3) acts of protest, (4) con­
ducted openly and (5) non-violently,49 (6) by actors willing to risk 
punishment.5o Implicit in this definition is the notion of a social 
48. See Katz, supra note 23, at 905 (noting the term "is used in a variety of ways 
by practitioners, philosophers, lawyers, and others"); Mark Edward DeForrest, Civil 
Disobedience: Its Nature and Role in the American Legal Landscape, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 
653,654 (1997-98) (citing the "serious dispute over exactly what the term 'civil disobedi­
ence' means"); Kevin H. Smith, Essay-Therapeutic Civil Disobedience: A Preliminary 
Exploration, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 99, 111 (2000) (acknowledging the lack of an agreed­
upon definition); Susan W. Tiefenbrun, On Civil Disobedience, Jurisprudence, Feminism 
and the Law in the Antigones of Sophocles and Anouilh, 11 CARDOZA STUD. L. & 
LITERATURE 35, 36 (1999) (calling civil disobedience "a confusing concept"). For a 
look at the diversity among civil disobedients themselves, see infra notes 59-87 and 
accompanying text. 
49. The fIrst five characteristics come courtesy of Bill Durland and his essay, The 
Philosophy of Civil Disobedience, in CONSCIENCE & THE LAW: A COURT GUIDE FOR 
THE CiVILLY DISOBEDIENT 2-3 (William Durland ed., 1982). As Durland acknowl­
edges, "[t]he line between violence and non-violence is not sharp but rather infinitely 
graded." Id. at 4. Notwithstanding the inescapably coercive nature of just about every 
political act, see RIENHOLD NIEHBUR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 241 (1960) 
("[N]on-violence does coerce and destroy."); Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, In­
junctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 70 (1990) (acknowledging 
the "coercion, which civil disobedience inevitably involves to some extent"), this fifth 
characteristic will be deemed present so long as "no harm is directed toward any per­
sons." Quigley, supra note 5, at 16. But see Howard Zinn, A Fallacy on Law and Order: 
That Civil Disobedience Must Be Absolutely Nonviolent, in CiVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND 
VIOLENCE 103-11 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1971). 
Harm directed toward property will not preclude conduct from being classified as 
civil disobedience provided the six characteristics are present. See Charles R. DiSalvo, 
Necessity's Child: The Judiciary, Disobedience, and the Bomb, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911, 
915 (1987) (describing the attack of "missile components, bomb-carrying submarines 
and airplanes, and missile silos with blood, carpenters' hammers and jackhammers" as 
"acts of antinuclear civil disobedience"). But see Ledewitz, supra, at 70 n.15 (excluding 
intentional destruction of property from his definition based on the inability of the ar­
rest to "restore the object of the protest to his former condition"). For perhaps the 
most famous example of civil disobedience involving the destruction of property, see 
Matthew 21:12 ("Then Jesus went into the temple of God ... and overturned the tables 
of the moneychangers and the seats of those who sold doves."). 
50. This sixth element, which can be found in Sanford Jay Rosen's, Civil Disobe­
dience and Other Such Techniques: Law Making Through Law Breaking, 37 OEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 435, 455-56 (1969) (calling "an absolute willingness if need be to suffer 
personally the consequences that are provided for the enforcement of the violated 
laws" an "essential condition of the ... disobedient act") (emphasis added), is another 
source of contention. For "[s]ome legal theorists and philosophers ... the act of civil 
disobedience is incomplete unless the actor willingly accepts punishment ... and any 
defense is therefore inappropriate." Laura Schulkind, Note, Applying the Necessity De­
fense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 112 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Cf Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 6 (1966) 
(describing punishment as "more than a possible consequence of [the civil disobedi­
ent's] act-it is the natural and proper culmination of it") with HOWARD ZINN, THE 
ZINN READER 378-83 (1997) [hereinafter THE ZINN READER] ("Why agree to be pun­
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reformer working within the structure of the existing government.51 
The civil disobedient, in other words, seeks the re-evaluation of a 
policy, not the destruction of the social contract.52 
Conduct satisfying these six elements may be differentiated de­
pending upon the nature of the law transgressed.53 Whereas "di­
rect" civil disobedience involves the breach of a law that is the 
object of the demonstration,54 "indirect" civil disobedience signifies 
the violation of a law, inoffensive in itself and only tangentially con­
ished when you think you have acted rightly, and the law, punishing you for that, has 
acted wrongly?"). Some scholars, supportive of protestors unwilling to admit guilt or 
accept punishment, nonetheless acknowledge a fundamental difference between this 
tact and the one pioneered by M. K. Gandhi. See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, Civil Resis­
tance: The Dictates of Conscience and International Law Versus the American Judiciary, 
6 FLA. J. INT'L L. 5, 18 (1990) [hereinafter Lippman, International Law Versus the 
American Judiciary] ("[I]n contrast to Gandhi, many American disobedients have not 
been willing to concede their legal guilt."). Rather than push for a definition broad 
enough to include actors who attempt to justify their conduct, they describe the acts of 
defendants like Crowe as "civil resistance" or "citizen intervention." See id. at 42 n.308 
(citing FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1987)); Robert Aldridge & Virginia Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and 
the Necessity Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 299, 299 (1986). Although lawyers 
representing protestors contemplating a necessity defense would be well advised to con­
sider Boyle's admonition to "never refer to your case as one of civil disobedience since 
such a characterization assumes the guilt of your clients," Lippman, International Law 
Versus the American Judiciary, supra, at 50 n.313, herein "all the activities of protestors 
charged with criminal actions will be defined as civil disobedience." Quigley, supra note 
5, at 19. 
51. Morris Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEX L. REV. 507, 508 
(1965); see also Susan Tiefenbrun, Civil Disobedience and the U.S. Constitution, 32 Sw. 
U. L. REv. 677, 687 (2003) ("Civil disobedience is not an effort to overthrow the 
government. "). 
52. Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It: The 
Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1173, 
1191-92 (1987). See also Martin C. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience 
Justification, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 1069, 1094 (1991) ("Because it 
is a political act, done with the goal of benefiting the community, civil disobedience 
legitimizes both the government in power and the primacy of conscience."); Michael L. 
Kessler, Note, Antinuclear Demonstrations and the Necessity Defense: State v. Warshow, 
5 VT. L. REv. 103, 105 (1980) (contrasting revolution, which "seeks to overthrow or 
repudiate the established autlrority," with civil disobedience, which "accepts the general 
legitimacy of authority but attacks some particular aspect of such authority in order to 
effect a change"); ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 59 
(1970) ("Civil disobedience, even in its broadest sense, does not apply to efforts to 
overthrow the government ...."). 
53. Ledewitz, supra note 49, at 71. 
54. Id. For example, in 1996, when an Essex package store owner violated one of 
the state's "lingering, Puritan-era blue laws" by selling alcohol on Sundays, Sacha Pfeif­
fer, Essex Liquor Store Owner Takes on Blue Law, High Court Hears Opening Argu­
ments, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1999, at Bl, available at 1999 WL 6056925, he 
engaged in direct civil disobedience by breaking the particular law he sought to change. 
Schulkind, supra note 50, at 112. 
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nected to the purpose of the prot est. 55 
Another distinction sometimes drawn is between moral and 
political disobedience. 56 According to philosopher Carl Cohen, 
"[m]oral civil disobedience is the protestor's response to a direct 
conflict between his [sic] personal ethical principles and some law 
of the state. It mayor may not have some tendency to produce a 
desired political change .... Political civil disobedience is essen­
tially a tactic. "57 Of course, these two types of disobedience need 
not be mutually exclusive. One might act out of principle while si­
multaneously believing in the power of the action to alter the politi­
cal landscape. The subject of this Note, then, is civil disobedience, 
"political in the sense that [a] motive is to effectively change condi­
tions"58 by bringing marginalized perspectives into the marketplace 
of ideas. 
2. Origins 
The practice of civil disobedience in Massachusetts began with 
the quest for freedom of conscience. 59 Not long after the Pilgrims' 
arrival in Plymouth, a Wampanoag sagamore named Massasoit be­
friended a Salem preacher by the name of Roger Williams and dis­
cussed with him "various questions of social organization, especially 
the religious tolerance issue, for which the red chief rightly judged 
Williams to be ready."60 Williams's subsequent injection of "the 
highly heretical"61 doctrine of religious freedom into the market­
55. Katz, supra note 23, at 906. On January 4, 1988, when eight members of 
MASS ACf OUT handcuffed themselves to chairs at the Boston State House, their 
objective was not to display their opposition to the trespass law they happened to 
break. David Arnold, Eight Gay Rights Supporters Fined for Roles in State House Pro­
test, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1988, at B30, available at 1988 WlA599344. Rather, 
the members of this gay/straight alliance trespassed in order to demonstrate their dissat­
isfaction with '''homophobic' lawmakers who ... refused to grant gays equal protection 
under the law." Id. 
56. Durland, supra note 49, at 5. 
57. Id. (quoting CARL COHEN, ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, 
AND LAW (1971»; cf. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 109-11 (1985) 
(distinguishing between "integrity-based," "justice-based," and "policy-based" 
disobedience). 
58. Durland, supra note 49, at 6. 
59. Straughton Lynd & Alice Lynd, Introduction to NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xii (Straughton Lynd & Alice Lynd eds., 1995) [hereinafter 
NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA]' 
60. W. J. Sidis, Narragansett Bay Settlements, in The Tribes and The States 
(1935) (unpublished manuscript by John W. Shattuck, pseud.), available at http://www. 
sidis.netlTSChap8.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2005). 
61. Id. 
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place led to his banishment from Massachusetts in 1636 and marked 
one of the first recorded acts of civil disobedience in the colony.62 
Although most subsequent colonial protests involved chal­
lenges to the Puritan theocracy,63 Massachusetts authorities were 
also forced to deal with "ordinary white Englishmen" who chose 
not to fight in "King Phillip's War"64 and crowds seeking to enforce 
"the rules of the moral economy."65 By the onset of -the Revolu­
62. Williams refused to accept "that body-killing, soule-killing, and State-killing 
doctrine of not permitting, but persecuting all other consciences and wayes of worship." 
NONVIOLENCE TN AMERICA, supra note 59, at xiii. According to several commentators, 
Williams also insisted on espousing the equally heretical idea that "the land still be­
longed to Native Americans." Quigley, supra note 5, at 20 n.64. See also DUANE CHAM­
PAGNE, NATIVE AMERICA: PORTRAIT OF THE PEOPLES 81 (1994). 
63. See MARGARET HOPE BACON, THE QUIET REBELS: THE STORY OF THE 
QUAKERS IN AMERICA 26-35 (1985) (comparing the first Massachusetts Quakers to 
twentieth century civil rights leaders in their willingness to "go into the lion's den and 
look their bloody laws in the face"); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1492-l'REsENT 107 (1995) [hereinafter ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY] 
(chronicling the defiance of Ann Hutchinson, a mother of thirteen children who insisted 
that "she, and other ordinary people, could interpret the Bible for themselves"); W. J. 
Sidis, New Sects, in The Tribes and The States (1935) (unpublished manuscript by John 
W. Shattuck, pseud.) available at http://www.sidis.netffSChaplO.htm (describing the 
civil disobedience that transpired after Massachusetts authorities decided that the chil­
dren of a Quaker couple should be "sold into slavery to pay for their parents' defaulted 
pew-rent in the Puritan meeting-house") (last visited Apr. 28, 2005); NONVIOLENCE TN 
AMERICA, supra note 59, at xiii-xiv (recounting the Quakers' "nonviolent invasion of 
Massachusetts Bay"); Ledewitz, supra note 49, at 73 (citing Massachusetts churches that 
refused to pay taxes on religious grounds); Leonard W. Levy, BLASPHEMY IN MASSA­
CHUSETTS: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE ABNER KNEELAND CASE vii, xv n.26 
(1973) (citing Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838» (providing a 
documentary record of the last imprisonment by the Commonwealth for the crime of 
blasphemy). 
64. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY, supra note 63, at 16. See also FRANCIS JENNINGS, 
THE INYASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 
299 (1975) ("[M]ilitiamen of Massachusetts and Plymouth energetically dodged 
impressment."). 
65. Drake Bennett, The Mobs of Boston, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2003, at 
H1, H4 (defining the "moral economy" as what poor people were willing and able to 
pay for food). The extent to which crowd action in colonial Massachusetts comports 
with this Note's definition of civil disobedience is difficult, if not impossible, to discern. 
Did the Bostonians who "demolished the public market in Dock Square" conduct 
themselves "nonviolently?" ZINN, A PEOPLE's HISTORY, supra note 63, at 51 (noting 
the commentary of a contemporary conservative writer aghast at the crowd's "murmur­
ing against the Government & the rich people"). Historian Howard Zinn's rather 
sparse account makes no mention of physical violence. Yet, it may well be that the so­
called "rabble" did not adhere to the criteria set forth earlier. The "Boston Tea Party" 
presents a similar problem. Although many commentators point to it as a prime exam­
ple of civil disobedience, see, e.g., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KiNG, JR. 50 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986), 
it was carried out by colonists disguised as Native Americans under the cover of dark­
ness. Quigley, supra note 5, at 20 n.65. Was this act "conducted openly?" If nothing 
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tionary War, some commentators assert that civil disobedience in 
Massachusetts was more or less institutionalized.66 
3. Evolution 
Clearly then, civil disobedience in the Commonwealth did not 
commence with Henry David Thoreau's "famed one night in jail for 
refusing to pay the Massachusetts Poll Tax."67 Nor, obviously, did it 
end there. Indeed, civil disobedience would eventually play an inte­
gral part in battles for emancipation,68 women's suffrage,69 diver-
else, such dilemmas serve to demonstrate the wisdom of Carl Cohen who noted 
"[a]bsolute precision in definition and the use of categories in this area is out of the 
question .... [B]orderline cases are sure to arise concerning which we are likely to 
remain in doubt." Cohen, supra note 50, at 2. For two exegeses on this subject, see RAy 
RAPHAEL, THE FIRST AMERICAN REVOLUTION: BEFORE LEXINGTON AND CONCORD 
(2002) and DIRK HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS, 
1765-1780 (1977). 
66. See, e.g., W. J. Sidis, The Period of Civil Disobedience, in The Tribes and The 
States (1935) (unpublished manuscript by John W. Shattuck, pseud.) available at http:// 
www.sidis.netrrSChap20.htm (describing the "civil disobedience regime in Massachu­
setts") (last visited Apr. 28, 2005). 
67. Ledewitz, supra note 49, at 73. See also JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. 
HORTON, IN HOPE OF LIBERTY 241 (1997) (recalling how black Massachusetts aboli­
tionist Charles Lenox Remond "anticipated Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience' and argued 
that African Americans should be willing to go to jail rather than pay taxes to institu­
tions that discriminated against them"); Carl Watner, Highway Tax vs. Poll Tax: Some 
Thoreau Tax Trivia, THE VOLUNTARYIST, Dec. 1994, at 'II 6, 71, available at http://www 
members.aol.comlvlntrystlwn71.html#hdt (indicating both Bronson Alcott and Charles 
Lane were arrested in 1843, more than two years before Thoreau, for the non-payment 
of their respective poll taxes). But cf Cohen, supra note 50, at 4 ("Thoreau's act may 
have been noble but in seeking to place himself above the law, or outside its jurisdic­
tion, he acted as a rebel and strictly did not engage in civil disobedience."). Even if the 
practice is not "as old as our species," Harvey Wheeler, The Constitutionality of Civil 
Disobedience, 35 UWLA L. REV. 440, 440 (2003) (citing popular protests in "Homer 
and Rig-Veda, Bible and Scripture, Talmud and Koran"), it certainly pre-dates the act 
of the essayist who coined the phrase. See Durland, supra note 49, at 2 (noting Gandhi's 
attribution of the term to Thoreau). 
68. See Francis A. Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 175, 187 (1967) (recalling the July 4,1854 Framingham address of William Lloyd 
Garrison, during which the famed abolitionist burned copies of the Fugitive Slave Act 
and the Constitution); Ledewitz, supra note 49, at 75 (describing the 1856 Boston "res­
cue" of a slave named Shadrach in which he "was spirited right out of a federal 
courtroom "). 
69. See Charles R. DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good Order: An Argument for AL­
lowing Lawyers to Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L. REv. 109,115-16 (1982) 
(quoting Susan B. Anthony) (celebrating the nineteenth century defiance of a Worces­
ter woman named Sarah E. Wall who refused to submit to taxation until her right to 
vote was recognized); LINDA G. FORD, IRON-JAWED ANGELS: THE SUFFRAGE MILI· 
TANCY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY 1912-1920, at 241-42 (1991) (citing the Feb­
ruary 1919 arrest and imprisonment of twenty-one Boston women who marched 
through a line of Marines in "a classic instance of nonviolent resistance to authority"). 
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sity,7° labor rights,71 disability rights,n welfare rights,73 gay rights,74 
convict rights,75 animal rights,76 and affordable housing,77 and 
against environmental degradation,78 nuclear energy,79 pornogra­
phy,80 Puritanism,81 abortion,82 standardized testing,83 state budget 
70. See Peter M. Cicchino, An Activist at Harvard Law School, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 
551, 557-58, 561 (2001) (recounting the April 7, 1992 nonviolent blockade of the 
Harvard Law School Dean's office as a means of protesting the school's "rejection of 
several qualified women of color for tenure track positions"); Don Aucoin & Steve 
Marantz, City, after sit-in, urges project hire more minorities, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 
7, 1991, at B20, available at 1991 WL 7516605. 
71. See A. J. Muste, The Lawrence Strike of1919, in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 
supra note 59, at 129-41 (reflecting upon his role in the "outlaw strike" of textile 
workers). 
72. See Thomas Grillo, Wheelchair Users' Protest Tactics Result in Arrests, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 2000, at B3, available at 2000 WL 3340784 (documenting the 
civil disobedience of activists protesting a conference for advocates of assisted suicide). 
73. See FRANCES Fox PNEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVE­
MENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 274 (1977) (noting the spring 1967 sit-in 
by welfare rights groups at the Boston welfare department which prompted the police 
to "beat the demonstrators [who] screamed from the windows to the streets below, 
triggering three days of rioting"). 
74. See Paul P. Feeney, Trial of 14 Gay Rights Supporters Continued, THE Bos­
TON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1988, at B28, available at 1988 WL 4597298 (reporting on civil 
disobedience in response to the "Senate's refusal to allow a final vote on a gay rights 
bill"). 
75. See Rebecca Duran, Charges on Turner Dropped Councilor had been Arrested 
in Protest, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 7, 2001, at B7, available at 2001 WL 3945845 
(reporting on civil disobedience in response to a new state policy barring former con­
victs from government employment). 
76. See 4 Arrested at Gillette, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1995, at 74, available 
at 1995 WL 5956163 (documenting the sit-in of one activist "dressed as a rat, and three 
others wearing 'bloodied' lab coats"). 
77. See Zenobia Lai, Andrew Leong & Chi Chi Wu, The Lessons of the Parcel C 
Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 21 n.111 
(2000) (describing the late 1960s occupation of a "surface parking lot" by African­
American activists in Boston's South End that gave birth to "Tent City"-"a three-day 
demonstration where 4,000 people converged on the lot"). 
78. See Kyle Bettigole, Comment, Defending Against Defense: Civil Resistance, 
Necessity and the United States Military'S Toxic Legacy, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 
667, 704 (1994) (describing the 1982 arrest, trial, conviction, and two-month jail sen­
tence of a Cape Cod resident who laid down in the road at the entrance of a Massachu­
setts military base to protest its hazard waste disposal practices). 
79. Harvey Wasserman, Nuke Trial Progresses, THE VALLEY ADVOCATE, Sept. 
25, 1974, at http://old.valleyadvocate.coml25thlarchives/progresses.html(reporting on 
the trial of Sam Lovejoy, who toppled a 500 foot Northeast Utilities tower in Montague 
based on the belief that atomic energy was "horrendously unsafe"). 
80. Andrea Dworkin, Pornography's Part in Sexual Violence, in LETI'ERS FROM A 
WAR ZoNE: WRITINGS 1976-1989 (1993), available at http://www.nostatusquo.coml 
ACLU/dworkinlWarZoneChaptIVC.html (praising the work of the "National Rampage 
Against Penthouse" in inspiring Provincetown women to "invade bookstores ... and 
tear up magazines until arrested"). 
81. See Wendy McElroy, The Free Love Movement and Radical Individualism in 
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cuts,84 colonialism,85 militarism,86 and warP 
the 19th Century, THE LIBERTARIAN ENTERPRISE, Oct. 1, 1996, <J[ 11-12, available at 
http://www.ncc-I776.comltheI996/le96/008.html. Benjamin Tucker, editor of the Bos­
ton-based publication Liberty, became 
so outraged by the post office's refusal to carry Walt Whitman's book of 
poems Leaves of Grass due to its alleged obscenity that he published his own 
edition and flaunted its sale. Addressing the post office and District Attorney 
Stevens, Tucker wrote: "You are hereby distinctly notified-all of you in gen­
eral, and you, Oliver Stevens, in particular that I have now in my possession, 
and do now offer for sale, copies ... Yours, disrespectfully." 
Id. 
82. See Commonwealth v. Blake, 654 N.E.2d 64 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (discussing 
a defendant who chained himself beneath an automobile to obstruct access to an abor­
tion clinic). 
83. Doreen ludica Vigue & Tara Yaekel, Hundreds of Students Boycott MCAS 
Test, Sanctions are Issued in Scattered Protests, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2000, at 
AI, available at 2000 WL 3322149 (noting the statewide student opposition to the con­
troversial standardized test). 
84. See Rick Klein & Raphael Lewis, Romney Vetoes $201M in Spending Local 
Aid, Welfare Funds Reduced, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2003, at AI, available at 2003 
WL 3405965 (documenting the arrest of twenty demonstrators, including Boston City 
Councilor Chuck Turner, who staged a sit-in at the statehouse). 
85. Francie Latour, Confrontation continues in courtroom: Plymouth police, 
protesters disagree in accounts of melee, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1997, at Bl, 
available at 1997 WL 6282721 (reporting on the Thanksgiving arrest of twenty-five Na­
tive American protestors). 
86. See War Resisters League, History of War Tax Resistance, at http://www.war 
resisters.orglhistory_wtr.htm ("[I]n 1989, the IRS seized and auctioned the Colrain, 
MA, home of war tax resisters Randy Kehler and Betsy Corner; shortly thereafter, the 
home of resisters Bob Bady and Pat Morse, neighbors of Kehler-Corner, was also 
seized and auctioned.") (last visited July 8, 2004). 
87. See THE ZINN READER, supra note 50, at 368 (describing the draft registra­
tion card burning in South Boston that gave rise to United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968), the leading case on symbolic speech); Alice Hinkle, Lexington's Other Bat
tle: 30 Years after Clash over Vietnam, Sense of Respect Prevails, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 20, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3934382 (remembering the "symbolic, Memorial 
Day weekend version of Paul Revere's ride" undertaken by "disgruntled Vietnam vet­
erans" which "prompted the largest mass arrest in Massachusetts up to that time"). 
The effectiveness of civil disobedience has been, and will continue to be, the sub­
ject of scholarly studies and debates. See Bernard D. Lambek, Necessity and Interna
tional Law: Arguments for the Legality of Civil Disobedience, 5 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 
472,480 (1987) (noting the difficulty of isolating the effect of a particular factor on the 
overall success or failure of a broad social movement); NOAM CHOMSKY, UNDERSTAND­
ING POWER: THE INDISPENSABLE CHOMSKY 1-4 (Peter R. Mitchell & John Schoeffel 
eds., 2002) (discussing "The Achievements of Domestic Dissidence"). Putting aside the 
question of whether the practice tends to help or hurt social protest movements, the 
attention it inevitably generates testifies to its efficacy in putting new or controversial 
notions into the marketplace of ideas. See Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. 
Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 n.9 (D. Utah 1986) ("While the mass media often 
pays little attention to unorthodox or unpopular ideas, dramatic displays of action cap­
ture media attention when words alone will not."); Elisabeth J. Beardsley, S. End re
sidents to draw a line on crosswalk, THE BOSTON HERALD, June 5, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 3027227 (demonstrating how the mere mention of civil disobedience is often 
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By the latter half of the twentieth century, the "sit-in"88 had 
become a particularly popular form of civil disobedience for those 
seeking to express "the passion of unconventional views in basically 
non-violent ways."89 In Massachusetts, one such act at a Plymouth 
park precipitated a series of appellate court decisions that would 
ultimately preclude the Crowe defendants from asserting a neces­
sity defense.90 
II. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE AND THE MOTION IN LIMINE 
A. An Overview of the Necessity Defense 
1. 	 Definition 
When successful, the necessity defense justifies criminal behav­
ior, thereby avoiding the application of the usual criminal rule.91 
Also known as the "competing harms"92 or "choice of evils"93 de­
fense, it requires a "balancing test" to establish whether illegal con­
duct was perpetrated to prevent a more serious harm.94 If it was, 
enough to propel an obscure issue, such as "long-term dilly-dallying over promised 
crosswalks," into public consciousness). 
88. One commentator defines the "sit-in" as "a politically motivated, nonviolent, 
physical occupation in violation of some law." Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law 
of the American Sit-in, 16 WHITfIER L. REv. 499, 502 (1995) [hereinafter Ledewitz, 
American Sit-in]. 
89. 	 Id. 
90. Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). For a discus­
sion of this case, see infra Part II.A.3. As "intolerant mother of a long line of rebels," 
NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 59, at xiii, Massachusetts has witnessed more 
acts of civil disobedience than one Note could possibly address. In addition to Averill, 
Brugmann, Hood, and Brogan, Massachusetts jurisprudence in this area has also been 
shaped significantly by Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993) (allowing 
defendants charged with operating an illegal needle exchange program to present evi­
dence of necessity, but denying a jury instruction on the doctrine), Commonwealth v. 
Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1991) (refusing to permit assertion of medical neces­
sity defense), and Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 (Mass. 1990) 
(permitting protestors at a weapons manufacturer to present evidence of necessity, but 
denying a jury instruction on the doctrine). 
91. Joseph R. Nolan & Laurie J. Sartorio, Necessity; Custom, 32 MASS. PRAc. 
§ 678 (3d ed. 2001). 
92. See Richard W. Bishop, Competing Harms-Necessity, 17B MASS. PRAC. 
§ 52.70 (4th ed. 1997). 
93. See Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) 
("[N]ecessity is fairly raised 'only if there is evidence that would warrant a reasonable 
doubt whether the (trespass) was justified' as a choice between evils.") (citation omit­
ted) (emphasis added). 
94. 	 Schulkind, supra note 50, at 82. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (2d 
Pocket ed. 2001). 	 Black's defines jus necessitates as 
A person's right to do what is required for which no threat of legal punish­
ment is a dissuasion. This idea implicates the proverb that necessity knows no 
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then the law concedes that punishing a person "who, with no legal 
alternative, acts reasonably" fails to "serve a useful purpose."95 
2. Origins 
The necessity doctrine is rooted in the ancient recogmtlOn 
"that 'justice' and 'law enforcement' are not always coterminous," 
and there are times when a technical breach of the law will bring 
about a more desirable result than adherence."96 Although Massa­
chusetts, unlike many other states, has never codified the defense,97 
law (necessitas non habet legen), so that an act that would be objectively un­
derstood as necessary is not wrongful even if done with full and deliberate 
intention. 
Id. 
95. Anne Lindquist, Comment, Job's Plight Revisited: The Necessity Defense and 
the Endangered Species Act, 33 ENVTL. L. 449, 460-61 (2003) (citing deterrence and 
rehabilitation as typical purposes of criminal sanctions); see also Susan B. Apel, Opera­
tion Rescue and the Necessity Defense: Beginning a Feminist Deconstruction, 48 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 41, 42 (1991) (noting the utilitarian and moral reasons for permitting the 
defense as well as the flexibility it provides to avoid unjust or foolish outcomes). The 
assertion of necessity often appeals to the political protestor "since it directly relates to 
the issues that compelled the defendant to commit civil disobedience" and "provides an 
opportunity for the defendant to educate the jury and judge about the subject of her 
protest." Deborah Greenblatt, Defense of the Civilly Disobedient, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 
158, 181 (1982). See also Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 52, at 1176 (noting the attrac­
tiveness of the defense because it enables the civilly disobedient "to deny gUilt without 
renouncing their socially driven acts"). 
96. Schulkind, supra note 50, at 83-84. Two commentators have traced the En­
glish common law origins of the defense back to the sixteenth century .case of Reninger 
v. Fagossa, 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (1551). Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Gar­
land, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291 (1974) (quoting the Fagossa court's acknowledg­
ment that "[a] man may break the words of the law, and yet not break the law itself ... 
where the words of them are broken to avoid greater inconvenience, or through neces­
sity, or by compulsion"). Despite this long history, the defense in the United Kingdom 
has seldom been successful. Brent D. Wride, Comment, Political Protest and the Illinois 
Defense of Necessity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1070, 1073 (1987) (describing the fear of En­
glish judges "that a broad necessity defense would too easily sanction departures from 
legality and encourage private determinations of law"). 
97. Schulkind, supra note 50, at 83 n.21. In Brugmann, the court cited Chapter 
263, section 40 of the Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts which read in part: 
(a) Conduct is justified if it is necessary to avoid a harm, prov~ded that: (1) the 
harm sought to be avoided by such conduct is clearly greater than that sought 
to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; (2) neither this code 
nor any other statute defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses 
dealing with the specific situation involved; and (3) a legislative purpose to 
exclude the justification does not otherwise plainly appear. 
Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 460 n.s. Ultimately, the Proposed Criminal Code was sent to 
a special committee "for further study, and eventually failed to be enacted." Michael E. 
Malamut, Proposal for Revision of Archaic Statutes Implicating Private Consensual 
Noncommercial Adult Sexual Contact, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 45, 47-48 (1993). 
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its highest court first indicated that it would accept a competing 
harms claim in 1840.98 
The first major test of the defense's availability in the Com­
monwealth carne six years later in the wake of Dorr's Rebellion99 
when a Rhode Island militiaman named William Blodgett led a 
posse into Massachusetts in pursuit of four suspected insurgents.1oo 
Upon finding the four suspects unarmed in a Bellingham inn,IOI 
Blodgett ordered them bound and returned to Rhode Island.102 
Massachusetts, in an apparent attempt to instill respect for its bor­
ders,103 charged Blodgett and an assistant with kidnapping.104 
At the close of their trial, the defendants' attorney asked the 
court to instruct the jury "that Rhode Island, being in a state of civil 
war and insurrection ... had a right ... to order her troops over the 
lines and into the territory of Massachusetts, to protect herself 
against insurgents ... whenever she deemed it necessary so to do 
98. Bishop, supra note 92, at 315 (citing Commonwealth v. Elwell, 43 Mass. (2 
Met.) 190, 192 (1840)). Elwell involved an unmarried man named Charles Elwell and 
an unnamed married woman tried jointly for the crime of adultery. Elwell, 43 Mass. (2 
Met.) at 190. In discussing whether the Commonwealth had the burden to prove Elwell 
had knowledge of the woman's marital status the court noted that "if a man does an act, 
which would be otherwise criminal ... by force or the compulsion of others, in which 
his own will and mind do not instigate him to the act, or concur in it, it is matter of 
defence, to be averred and proved on his part." Id. at 192. 
99. Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56, 58-68 (1846). For the 
Blodgett court, the "great Rhode Island controversy" was one that "happily passed 
away." Id. at 78. For a brief look at the causes of the insurrection, see ZINN, A PEO· 
PLE'S HISTORY, supra note 63, at 209-11 (describing the rebellion as "both a movement 
for electoral reform and an example of radical insurgency ... prompted by the Rhode 
Island charter's rule that only owners of land could vote"). For a more in-depth treat­
ment, see Paul M. Thompson, Is There Anything "Legal" About Extralegal Action? The 
Debate Over Dorr's Rebellion, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 385, 396-431 (2002). 
100. Blodgett, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) at 57. 
101. Id. According to the court, when the Bellingham innkeeper asked Blodgett 
"by what authority he acted, [Blodgett] replied, 'by authority of this,' presenting his gun 
and bayonet to the breast of [the innkeeper]." Id. at 58. 
102. Id. at 57-58. 
103. Id. at 75 (citing the Commonwealth's argument that Rhode Island's claim 
"to use the territory of this State, in case of civil war, in capturing her rebel citizens, 
who have fled hither, is wholly repudiated by the law of nations"). 
104. Id. at 57. Blodgett and his assistant, Stephen Hendrick, were charged with 
violating REv. STS. c. 125, § 20, which provided for "the punishment of those who with­
out lawful authority forcibly confine any person in this state, or carry any person out of 
the state against his will." Id. at 56. The apparent impetus of the legislation was "to 
punish the kidnapping of negroes and others, for the purpose of making them slaves." 
Id. at 72. In spite of a vote by the General Assembly of the Rhode Island legislature to 
remunerate the defendants "for loss of time and expenses in attending to prosecutions 
instituted against them in the State of Massachusetts ... in the execution of a military 
order" id. at 68, the Governor of Rhode Island "disclaimed and repudiated the act" and 
"surrendered the defendants to be tried" in Massachusetts. Id. 
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for her own protection; she being ... the sole judge of the neces­
sity."105 The judge refused.106 Instead, he informed the jurors that 
"such capture by the troops of Rhode Island ... was unlawful, un­
less necessary in defence of the lives and property of the citizens of 
Rhode Island ...."107 As for whether such a necessity existed, the 
trial court concluded that "the jury, and not the State of Rhode 
Island, was the proper judge."108 
"This instruction," stated the Commonwealth's highest court, 
"gave the defendants the full benefit of any excuse, arising from the 
use of force in the necessary defence of the State and its citizens ... 
leaving a great latitude as to the means necessary to such de­
fence.''109 Deeming it impracticable to draw "any exact line of dis­
tinction as to the measures which such necessary defence would 
warrant,"110 the court confessed its inability to see how Blodgett's 
conduct could have been necessary.111 Nevertheless, it held that 
"the question was rightly submitted to the jury, as one of strictly 
necessary defence."112 
3. Evolution 
At 6:00 p.m. on October 7, 1978, the chief security officer for 
the Boston Edison Company's nuclear plant in Plymouth an­
nounced the closing of a park, which the company maintained and 
made available to the public during the day.113 When a group of 
activists who had been distributing leaflets describing the risks of 
nuclear energy refused to leave, the company called the Plymouth 
police.114 After a constable told the activists they would be arrested 
if they did not disperse, they held their ground and were arrested as 
"they expected they would be. "115 
At trial, the defendants raised the claim of necessity and for 
three days offered testimony concerning the perils of nuclear en­
ergy.116 Finally, on the fourth day, the Superior Court judge exer­
105. Id. at 70. 
106. Id. at 71. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 84. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 85. 
112. Id. 
113. Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6, 6-7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 7. 
116. Id. at 6. 
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cised the right he had reserved to stop hearing such evidence "if he 
concluded on so much of the evidence as he did hear that the de­
fense would not be available."1l7 
When the defendants challenged this ruling, the appellate 
court found itself in an area where Massachusetts jurisprudence 
was, as two commentators put it, "meagre [siC]."118 Lacking any 
bright-line rule to determine the availability of the competing 
harms defense, the court took the unusual first step of chiding the 
defendants for their attempt to avoid "a jail sentence or whatever 
less draconian sanction the law imposes."119 Based on a brief sur­
vey of other jurisdictions,12° the court concluded that "[a]ttempts to 
eliminate this disagreeable consequence of civil disobedience enjoy 
neither novelty nor a record of success."121 The primary reason for 
this poor record, the court determined, was the absence of a com­
ponent at the core of all justification defenses.122 
Unlike the defendant in Commonwealth v. Martin,123 "upon 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. Nolan & Sartorio, supra note 91, at 699 (citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 
Mass. 434 (1868), where "the Court held a wagon driver justified and hence not guilty 
of violating an ordinance which forbade stopping for over five minutes on a street be­
cause he had become unavoidably enmeshed in a traffic jam"). In 1974, two other com­
mentators described the "law of necessity" as "poorly developed in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence." Arnolds & Garland, supra note 96, at 291. 
119. Averill, 423 N.E.2d at 7. "Classically," the court wrote, "the [civilly disobedi­
ent] must accept the penalty for their violations of law." Id. (quoting Martin Luther 
King, Jr.) ("One who breaks an unjust law must do it openly ... and with a willingness 
to accept the penalty."). But see Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitima­
tion Theory and Civil Disobedience, 18 GA. L. REv. 929, 960 (1984). A decade before 
the Averill court rendered its decision, David Daube observed that one motive 
behind the restriction of the term [civil disobedience] to the takers-of-the-con­
sequences has to do with the honourable overtone nowadays attaching to it in 
a wide section of the public. Those who [attempt to] avoid or evade punish­
ment are to be debarred from this honourable category, with effects which are 
obviously welcome to the authorities. 
[d. (quoting D. DAUBE, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN ANTIQUITY 4 (1972». 
120. Averill, 423 N.E.2d at 7 (citing United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970». See also United States v. May, 622 
F.2d 1000, 1008-10 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom; Phipps v. United States, 449 
U.S. 984 (1980); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 702-04 & nn.8-9 (8th Cir. 
1972); Tsoumas v. New Hampshire, 472 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1979); State v. Dorsey, 
395 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1978). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. 341 N.E.2d 885, 891 (Mass. 1976). The Martin court held: 

An actor is justified in using force against another to protect a third person 

when (a) a reasonable person in the actor's position would believe his inter­
vention to be necessary for the protection of the third person, an,d (b) in the 
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which," the court wrote, "the defendants mistakenly rel[ied],"124 
the Averill defendants did not expect their conduct "to have any 
immediate consequences in reducing the danger apprehended."125 
While news of their arrest might aid the defendants' mission "in the 
long run," the court held that "publicity designed to marshal public 
opinion could not extinguish an immediate peril, if there was 
one."126 Ultimately, the court concluded, the competing harms de­
fense did not apply because it concerns only "obvious and generally 
recognized harms, not ... those which are debatable and, indeed, 
the subject of legislation and government regulation. "127 
At the close of its opinion, the Averill court dealt briefly with 
the protestors' final "unmeritorious" argument: "that the opportu­
nity afforded them to establish a defense of necessity earlier in the 
trial misled the defendants into abandoning other defenses."128 Al­
though the court refuted this claim by noting the defendants' failure 
to identify "any defense which they were foreclosed from establish­
ing,"129 the idea that justice required barring defendants from utter­
ing a word to jurors about nuclear power was one that 
Massachusetts appellate courts would soon embrace.13o 
B. An Overview of In Limine Practice 
1. Definition 
The term "in limine" means "on or at the threshold" or "at the 
very beginning."l3l Not surprisingly then, a motion in limine is usu­
ally brought prior to the start of a trial in order to obtain a court 
order precluding the opposition from presenting prejudicial evi­
dence to the jury.132 Its purpose is to prevent such matters from 
being introduced,133 for even if a subsequent motion to strike is sus­
tained, "all practicing lawyers know ... that prejudicial effects [can­
circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third 
person would be justified in using such force to protect himself. 
Id. 
124. Averill, 423 N.E.2d at 7. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 7-8. 
127. Id. at 8. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See infra Part III.A. 
131. Howard J. Alperin & Lawrence D. Shubow, Motion in Limine, 14 MASS. 
PRAC. § 3.211 n.1 (3d ed. 2003). 
132. Id. at § 3.211. 
133. Richard D. Bishop, In Limine, 17C MASS. PRAC. § 59.85 (3d ed. 2003). 
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not] be overcome by instructions to the jury."134 
2. Origins 
Because the motion in limine is generally brought prior to trial, 
its use has frequently gone unrecorded in reported decisions, mak­
ing the historical path of in limine practice difficult to track.135 
However, given the common law's strong inclination to conduct tri­
als "cohesively from start to finish,"136 it seems all but certain that 
any pretrial technique giving rise to "bifurcated proceedings" would 
have been traditionally disfavored, if not altogether ignored.137 Not 
until courts came to see how pretrial devices, like discovery, en­
hanced efficiency did this prejudice begin to fade.138 When it did, 
the motion in limine made its first appearance in civil litigation. 139 
In search of the motion's progenitor in criminal proceedings, 
one commentator points both to "the motion to suppress, most 
commonly applied to illegally obtained evidence" and "the motion 
to strike or expunge matter, prejudicial or otherwise, from the 
pleadings."14o While its precise parentage may be unknown, it is 
134. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur­
ring) (calling this "naive assumption" an "unmitigated fiction"). See also Alperin & 
Shubow, supra note 131 (noting "the objection and the judge's corrective action may 
only reinforce the prejudicial effect of the matter in the minds of the jury"). 
135. Colbert, supra note 23, at 1275. 
136. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to use of Motion in 
Limine or Similar Preliminary Motion to Secure Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence or 
Reference to Prejudicial Matters, 63 A.L.R.3D 311, 314 (1975). 
137. Id. (citing the common law's bias in favor of procedures that allowed "the 
suitor, win, lose, or draw, literally (to have) his 'day in court"'). See also Henry B. 
Rosenblatt & David H. Leroy, Annotation, Motion in Limine Practice, 20 AM. JUR. 
TRIAL ADvoc. 441, § 3 (1973) ("Anglo-Saxon law encouraged the presentation of evi­
dence in an orderly and consecutive manner at a single hearing or trial."). 
138. Ghent, supra note 136, at 314-15. 
139. Colbert, supra note 23, at 1275. According to Professor Colbert, the phrase 
"in limine" first began to surface in Supreme Court decisions as early as 1816. Id. at 
1275 n.22. However, the motion's "modern-day version" did not appear until Missis­
sippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1867), when, in response to the plaintiff's argument "that 
state sovereignty vested Mississippi with the right to resist federal military governance 
under the Reconstruction Act," the Attorney General moved to strike Mississippi's 
complaint. Id. at 1275. This, Colbert claims, was the first attempt to employ the motion 
in limine "to prevent prejudicial material from interfering with the judicial factfinder's 
determination." Id. At the state level, commentators generally trace the motion's use 
back to Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 149 So. 729 (Ala. 1933), "although one 
writer recently discovered a 1926 case involving motion in limine." Id. at 1275 nn.20-21 
(citing Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Westrup, 278 S.W. 490 (Tex. App. 1925), affd, 285 
S.W. 1053 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926». For the origins of in limine practice in Massa­
chusetts, see infra Part lILA. 
140. Ghent, supra note 136, at 315. 
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generally acknowledged that the effort to preclude evidence prior 
to its introduction first became a criminal law issue in the case of 
State v. Smith.141 
In Smith, the defendant was charged with two counts of assault 
in a melee that erupted after union members chased the defendant 
and four other "private guards" of a lumber company through the 
streets of Bellingham, Washington.142 At the close of his direct ex­
amination of the accused, the defendant's attorney told the judge, 
outside the presence of the jury, that his client had previously de­
serted from the Marine Corps and that he feared the prosecutor 
intended to enlist "the destructive forces of prejudice"143 by cross­
examining the defendant "upon this phase of his past life."144 After 
a brief oral argument, the court granted the defendant's motion in 
limine,145 the jury returned, and the prosecutor proceeded to ask 
the defendant how his tour of duty with the Marines happened to 
conclude.146 The defendant answered truthfully, and the jury found 
him guilty of assault in the third degree.147 
On appeal, a divided court expressed its approval of the trial 
judge's decision to grant the motion,148 calling the prosecutor's 
question "highly prejudicial and of such a nature that the prejudice 
largely consists in the mere asking [of it]. "149 From this precedent, 
a considerable body of law concerning the applicability of the mo­
tion evolved.150 
3. Evolution 
In his Smith dissent, Justice Holcomb stopped just short of 
complimenting the defense attorney for the shrewd way in which he 
141. 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937). 
142. Id. at 1076. 
143. Rosenblatt & Leroy, supra note 137. 
144. Smith, 65 P.2d at IOn 
145. Cf. Rosenblatt & Leroy, supra note 137 (contending that because the motion 
was made "prior to cross-examination of the accused rather than before commence­
ment of the trial ... it was not a motion in limine in the definitional sense") with 
Colbert, supra note 23, at 1275 (conceding that while the "in limine procedure occurs 
most frequently before the commencement of trial ... the motion may be made at any 
time during the proceeding when a party first becomes aware that her adversary intends 
to use inflammatory material") (emphasis added). 
146. Smith, 65 P.2d at 1077-78. 
147. Id. at 1076. 
148. Rosenblatt & Leroy, supra note 137. 
149. Smith, 65 P.2d at 1078 ("It may well be that an objection to such a question, 
even though sustained, is more damaging to a defendant's case than almost any answer 
could be."). 
150. Rosenblatt & Leroy, supra note 137. 
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convinced the trial judge to "erroneously" keep from the jury the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's departure from the 
Marine Corps. 151 In the next twenty-five years, defense attorneys 
would mimic this "able strategy"152 by making similar motions in 
limine. Few, however, would be granted153 until the Warren 
Court's historic decision in Mapp v. Ohio 154 ushered in the era now 
famous for the rights it furnished the accused. 155 
"In this judicial atmosphere," Professor Douglas Colbert 
wrote, "the motion in limine became accepted as an additional 
mechanism to assure the accused's sixth and fourteenth amendment 
rights to a fair trial."156 As trial judges began to allow defense at­
torneys to employ the motion in limine to restrict the range of their 
clients' cross-examinations, they encouraged the testimony of many 
defendants who would have otherwise remained silent.157 By per­
mitting defense attorneys to prevent inquiries into their clients' pre­
vious convictions,158 courts brought key witnesses before juries, 
aiding their fact-finding endeavors.159 
Of course, defendants were not the only witnesses with crimi­
nal records, and it was not long before prosecutors began using the 
motion in limine to curtail the cross-examination of government 
witnesses.1OO As courts proved amenable to such motions, state at­
151. Smith, 65 P.2d at 1079 (Holcomb, J., dissenting). 
152. Id. (commenting on the defense attorney's efforts "to get the prosecution 
and the court bound in advance"). 
153. See, e.g., Johns v. State, 236 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951) ("[T]he 
State has the right to prove its case in any way it may see fit under proper rules and 
regulations, and an accused cannot be allowed to direct either the method or manner of 
such proof."). 
154. 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (overturning a conviction based on a warrant-less 
search in light of "the history of the criminal law [which] proves that tolerance of short­
cut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness") (citation omitted). 
155. Colbert, supra note 23, at 1280 (describing how the Warren Court read the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to require the states "to uphold federal 
constitutional safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures, involuntary con­
fessions, and suggestive police identification procedures") (footnotes omitted). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1281 (commenting on the occasions when "an accused would opt not 
to testify on her own behalf because of the likelihood that a prosecutor's cross-examina­
tion would concentrate on her prior criminal record, rather than on any inconsistencies 
in her trial testimony"). 
158. Id. at 1281 n.60 (citing Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 
1965)) ("[I]t is a more just, humane and expedient solution to allow the accused to tell 
his story without incurring the overwhelming prejudice likely to ensue from disclosing 
past convictions[.J"). 
159. Id. at 1281. 
160. See United States v. Morgan, 757 F.2d 1074, 1075, 1077 (10th Cir. 1985) (up­
holding trial court's order excluding "questions and evidence of murder charges filed" 
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torneys began "to test the outer limits of judicial receptivity by us­
ing the motion to exclude entire defenses they regard[ ed] as unduly 
prejudicial and irrelevant to the charges against the accused."161 
Unlike earlier defense efforts to expand the motion's use,162 these 
attempts often garnered broad in limine rulings, especially in fed­
eral courts.163 
III. THE MOTION IN LIMINE COMES TO MASSACHUSETTS 
A. Commonwealth v. Brugmann 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had yet to make 
an in limine rulingl64 when, on June 2, 1979, twenty-one people 
strode past a barrier at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company in 
Rowe and sat down against the main gate by a fence. 165 Cognizant 
against a government informant on the grounds that "[t]he alleged murders were collat­
eral to the issues at trial"); State v. Brown, 630 P.2d 731, 733 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) 
(affirming the decision to preclude the cross-examination of two state witnesses previ­
ously convicted of arson on the grounds that "the charges [in those cases] did not in­
volve dishonesty"); Scarborough v. State, 344 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) 
(approving of trial court's decision to grant prosecutorial motion in limine requesting 
that no questions be asked of a witness regarding his pending indictment for income tax 
evasion). 
161. Colbert, supra note 23, at 1283. 
162. See, e.g., State v. Flett, 380 P.2d 634, 637 (Or. 1963) ("We have found no 
authority ... which requires the court to submit to a dress rehearsal in which the defen­
dant may explore the state's evidence ...."). 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 476 F. Supp. 34, 41 (D. Colo. 1979). The Best 
court made the effects of its in limine ruling quite clear, holding: 
There will be no jury trial as to the morality or immorality of nuclear weapons 
or nuclear power. There will be no jury trial as to the wisdom or lack of wis­
dom of continuing any part of the nuclear program in this country. No jury 
will decide on the correctness vel non of any acts of Congress or the executive 
branch of the government. These are not decisions to be made by either judge 
or jury. There will be no jury trial involving the good or bad motives of any 
defendant. No jury will be asked to decide any political question, nor will a 
jury pass on the relevance or materiality of any defense. 
Id. 
164. By the time Brugmann reached the Appellate Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court had decided Commonwealth v. Diaz, 417 N.E.2d 950 (Mass. 1981) (affirming the 
trial court's denial of a defense motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of the 
defendant's two prior convictions for the same crime with which he was charged) and 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 420 N.E.2d 319, 322 n.2 (Mass. 1981) (upholding motion in 
limine which precluded the introduction of evidence relating to the defendant's previ­
ous acquittals on companion charges). 
165. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
Five weeks before, some of the defendants participated in a demonstration at the Yan­
kee Atomic plant, which culminated with the presentation of six demands to plant offi­
cials regarding the safe operation of the plant. Appellants' Brief at 35, Brugmann (No. 
81-908). "At that time it was stated that if a response was not forthcoming, that a non­
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of a federal regulation requiring the nuclear power plant "to shut 
down if unauthorized people remain[ ed] within twenty feet of its 
fence for any significant length of time,"166 the protestors refused to 
move and were arrested for trespassing.167 
Prior to their trial, fourteen of the protestors informed the 
judge of their intention to assert a necessity defense.168 The Com­
monwealth responded by filing a motion in limine asking that the 
competing harms defense be made unavailable.169 Upon hearing 
what the defendants intended to prove, the judge orally granted the 
Commonwealth's motion po Eleven defendants were subsequently 
convicted, and they appealed the trial court's decision.171 
After describing the "essence" of the necessity defense,112 Jus­
tice Greaney referenced a long history of understanding in Massa­
chusetts "that compulsion may negate criminal purpose,"173 then 
violent demonstration would take place on June 2nd, 1979 ...." Id. See also Defend­
ants' Memorandum for Admission of de bene Testimony and Evidence at 7-8, 
Brugmann (No. 81-908) (claiming the plant superintendent "was familiar with all the 
safety questions which the defendants presented to him at the April 29th rally ... yet 
... he did not respond to those questions or demands"). Prior to this second demon­
stration, several of the defendants informed the plant that "twenty to thirty" people 
might engage in civil disobedience. I!lefendants' Motion for directed Verdict or Motion 
for requested finding of Not Guilty at 2, Brugmann (No. 81-908). In response, the plant 
designated the gate as "off-limits" and erected the barrier the defendants disregarded. 
Id. at 2-3. 
166. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. In its amicus brief, Yankee Atomic claimed 
the defendants did not learn of this regulation until the plant superintendent offered 
testimony regarding it at trial. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yankee Atomic Electric Com­
pany at 12, 13, Brugmann (No. 81-908) (calling such testimony a "post-hoc rationaliza­
tion of their criminal behavior"). 
167. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. 
168. Id. See also Defendant's Memorandum: Admissibility of Choice of Evils De­
fense at 13, Brugmann (No. 81-908). In the alternative, the defendants (who appeared 
pro se during their trial and were represented by Attorneys Tom Lesser and Bill New­
man in their appeal) argued that they were justified in acting "in defense of themselves 
or others." Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. See also Appellants' Brief at 36-37, 
Brugmann (No. 81-908). 
169. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. See also Commonwealth's Brief in Opposition 
to Defendant's Argument Concerning the 'Choice of Evils' Defense at 1-8, Brugmann 
(No. A-43-79). 
170. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. The judge subsequently "allowed a voir dire, 
at which he heard the testimony of two experts offered by the defendants. At the con­
clusion of the voir dire, however, he excluded their testimony, apparently ruling that the 
evidence was insufficient as [a] matter of law to raise the defenses stated." Id. The trial 
court denied the Defendants' Motion for a Written Statement of the Judge's Ruling Not 
to Allow the Necessity Defense at 1, Brugmann (No. A-73-79). 
171. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 459. 
172. Id. at 460 (demonstrating how the defense "exonerates one who commits a 
crime under the 'pressure of circumstances' "). 
173. Id. at 460-61 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thurber, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 
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noted the Averill court's recent approach to a claim of necessity.174 
However, because that case and the instant one were "different 
both in fact and in law,"175 the court acknowledged that "until now, 
we have not directly considered the application of this defense in 
the present context. "176 Hence, Justice Greaney's first task became 
deciding under what conditions the necessity defense might be 
properly raised. After considering the approaches of other jurisdic­
tions,l77 he concluded that 
the application of the defense is limited to the following circum­
stances: (1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent dan­
ger, not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant 
can reasonably expect that his [sic] action will be effective as the 
direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal alterna­
tive which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the 
Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and 
deliberate choice regarding the values at issueP8 
Proceeding under this rubric, the court placed the preliminary 
burden on the defendants to produce evidence demonstrating the 
existence of such circumstances,179 then held that they had "failed 
(Mass. 1981». Thurber affirmed the trial court's use of the five requirements of a ne­
cessity claim in the context of a prison escape as articulated by People v. Lovercamp, 43 
Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32 (1974). 
174. See supra Part II.A.3. 
175. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 461 (distinguishing between the "informational 
protest" in Averill and "a protest directed at bringing an immediate end to what was, in 
the opinion of the defendants' experts, an emergency situation"). 
176. Id. (noting that aside from Averill and Thurber, the "competing harms" de­
fense appeared without "any analogue in Massachusetts statutes or case law"). 
177. Id. (citing State v. Dorsey, 395 N.E.2d 855 (N.H. 1978); State v. Koski, 411 
A.2d 122 (N.H. 1980); State v. Weitzman, 427 A.2d 3 (N.H. 1981); State v. Warshow, 
410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979); United States v. Best, 476 F. Supp. 34, 42-49 (D. Colo. 1979); 
State v. Greene, 623 P.2d 933 (Kan. 1981); State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 385-86 (Me. 
1979); People v. Chachere, 104 Misc. 2d 521, 522-26 (N.Y.S. 1980); State v. Marley, 509 
P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973); State v. Olsen, 299 N.W.2d 632 (Wis. 1980». 
178. Id. Cf Defendants' Memorandum: Admissibility of Choice of Evils Defense 
at 1, Brugmann (No. A-43-79) (advocating for allowance of the defense under the fol­
lowing circumstances: "(1) the defendant reasonably believed the act was necessary to 
avoid a substantial evil; (2) all other means of avoiding the danger had been exhausted; 
(3) the means used was not disproportionate to the threatened harm; and (4) the neces­
sity occurred in an emergency situation") with Brief of Amicus Curiae Yankee Atomic 
Electric Company at 9, Brugmann (No. A-43-79) ("At the very least, the necessity de­
fense has three elements. It requires a showing that (a) the danger is clear and immi­
nent, not debatable and speculative, (b) the defendant reasonably believed that his 
action would stop the danger, and (c) no legal alternatives were available to stop the 
danger.") (citations omitted). 
179. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 462 (describing the shift of burden which would 
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to make a sufficient showing of the third element. "180 It was incum­
bent upon the defendants, Justice Greaney wrote, to make them­
selves "aware of existing alternatives and pursue those which are 
lawful, or show them to be futile in the circumstances."181 Notwith­
standing evidence which suggested that the defendants had: (1) ini­
tiated nationwide petitions;182 (2) lobbied elected officials;183 (3) 
contacted the United States Nuclear Regulation Commission 
(NRC);I84 (4) presented their safety concerns to the plant superin­
tendent;185 and (5) filed a show cause suit against Yankee 
Atomic,186 the court identified two alternatives the protestors im­
permissibly failed to explore.187 
"First, the defendants could have sought to initiate action on 
the part of the NRC."188 In support of this proposition, the court 
cited NRC regulations detailing the process by which the defend­
ants might have enlisted "the government agency most directly in­
occur-provided the issue is properly raised-requiring the Commonwealth to prove 
lack of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt). 
180. [d. (indicating the apparent satisfaction of the first two elements). Given the 
defendants' inability to satisfy the third element, the court concluded, "we need not 
consider the question presented by the fourth element of the defense, i.e., whether it 
plainly appears that the Legislature has acted to exclude its operation in these circum­
stances." [d. at 463. 
181. [d. at 462. 
182. [d. at 460. See also Agreed Statement of Facts at 11, Brugmann (No. A-43­
79) (citing the testimony of defendant, Kristen Nelson, who "stated she had done every­
thing in her power to bring to the attention of the public the harms of low level radia­
tion and the disasters that an accident would create, including writing letters and signing 
petitions") (emphasis added). 
183. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 460. See also Agreed Statement of Facts at 9, 
Brugmann (No. A-43-79) (citing the testimony of defendant, Jeb Brugmann, whose lob­
bying efforts allowed him to witness "the frustration [legislators 1felt" in "their inability 
to stop the immediate harm to the public by the nuclear plants ..."). 
184. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 460. See also Defendants' Memorandum for Ad­
mission of de bene Testimony and Evidence at 7, Brugmann (No. A-43-79). 
185. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 460. 
186. [d. This suit was filed in 1974, five years before the occupation of the plant; 
however, because the defendants failed to provide the trial court with its particulars, the 
court considered reference to it incapable of demonstrating the futility of seeking in­
junctive relief. [d. at 463 n.8. 
187. [d. at 462-63. 
188. [d. at 462. In its amicus brief, Yankee Atomic urged the court to adopt a per 
se rule that would make the competing harms defense unavailable to any and all "anti­
nuclear demonstrators who break the law by trespassing on the premises of a licensed 
nuclear power plant." Brief of Amicus Curiae Yankee Atomic Electric Company at 4, 
Brugmann (No. A-43-79). In support of this argument, the company provided the fed­
eral court decisions and statutory provisions interpreting the NRC's mandate that 
found their way into Justice Greaney's decision. Cf Brief of Amicus Curie Yankee 
Atomic Electric Company at 6-8, Brugmann (No. A-43-79) with Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 
at 462. 
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volved with policing the safety of nuclear plants."189 Sensitive, 
perhaps, to the general impression that federal bureaucracies like 
the NRC tend to be inefficient-thereby prolonging, in this case, 
the exposure of Rowe residents to radiation linked "to the possible 
damage of the bone marrow and white blood cells, and an increased 
risk of leukemia, infant mortality and congenital defects"190-the 
court highlighted the NRC's authority to act expeditiously.191 
"While revocation, suspension, or modification actions generally 
must be in accord with the Administrative Procedure Act ... , if 
public health or safety so requires, such actions may be taken with 
immediate effect."192 As an alternative to this alternative, the court 
pointed to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Qual­
ity Engineering (DEQE)193 and invoked another long list of depart­
ment regulations to demonstrate how the defendants might have 
reached their laudable end through legal means.194 
Ultimately, the court concluded, "there was no showing that 
the defendants had pursued any of these remedies, or that such pur­
suit would have been futile."195 Characterizing the protestors' at­
tempts to publicize the dangers at Rowe as "well intentioned," the 
Brugmann court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's decision to 
grant the Commonwealth's motion in limine and refused to author­
ize the use of "the competing harms defense where established legal 
alternatives [had] been ignored."196 
B. Commonwealth v. O'Malley 
Less than five months after Brugmann, Justice Greaney again 
wrote for a unanimous court in another case involving a motion in 
limine barring the assertion of a necessity defense.197 In 1974, while 
incarcerated at M.C.!., Walpole, Timothy O'Malley was approached 
by three members of the "Devlin gang ... who were awaiting trial 
189. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 462-63 n.8. 
190. Id. at 460. 
191. Id. at 462. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 10 n.5, Brugmann (A-43-79). 
194. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 463 (citing MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 7.00, 
7.01, 7.02, 7.03, 7.51, 7.52, 8.02, 8.15(1), 8.15 (3), 8.21, 8.22, 8.31 (1980); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 111, §§ 2B, 2C, 5B, 142A, 142B; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 23; MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 111, § 2C, as appearing in ST.1975 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 706, § 162; MAss. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 142A, as appearing in ST. 1959, c. 422). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. . 
197. Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 439 N.E.2d 832, 832 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
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for conspiring to murder another inmate. "198 Aware of the defen­
dant's upcoming temporary transfer to the facility where the pri­
mary witness against them was being held, the Devlin gang 
attempted to persuade O'Malley to murder the government wit­
ness.199 When the defendant returned to Walpole that summer, 
having failed to fulfill his "mission," the gang's "execution squad" 
tried to kill him.2OO 
O'Malley testified against the Devlin gang at two trials and 
over the next six years had numerous threats made on his life.201 
By the summer of 1980, it had become clear to the defendant that 
he would be in particularly grave danger if ever he found himself in 
the Concord house of correction where a committed Devlin "execu­
tioner" named Larry McBride was serving time.202 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on September 6, 1980, O'Malley 
returned to a pre-release center in Lancaster where he was con­
fronted by an officer who asserted that earlier efforts to contact 
O'Malley had been unsuccessful.203 When no one answered the 
telephone at the car dealership where O'Malley worked,204 the su­
perintendent's office was alerted and, the decision was made to 
treat O'Malley as an escaped prisoner and transfer him "to Con­
cord that same night."205 
The defendant protested that he had not been trying to escape 
and attempted to communicate his concerns about going to Con­
cord.206 When the officer refused to listen, O'Malley fled.207 Five 
days later, the defendant's worst fears were realized when he was 
apprehended and assigned to a Concord cell next to Larry 
McBride.208 
O'Malley was charged with escaping from the Lancaster facil­
ity.209 At trial, the Commonwealth moved to preclude "evidence of 
198. Id. at 833. The head of the Devlin gang "was convicted of manslaughter for 
a killing in which the victim was shot, dismembered and decapitated." See id. at 833 n.2. 
199. Id. at 833. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 833-34. 
202. Id. at 834. 
203. Id. 




208. While McBride did not make good on his pledge to plunge a knife into 
O'Malley's chest, see id., it seems he did manage to break certain bones in the defen­
dant's face. Id. 
209. Id. at 833 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 16). 
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necessity on the ground that it would be insufficient to raise that 
defense as matter of law."210 This oral motion, "directed at virtu­
ally all the defendant's evidence," caught defense counsel off guard 
and prompted the judge to ask: "Can't you argue that to the 
jury?"211 When the prosecution claimed it could not, the judge 
scheduled a voir dire for the following day, and ultimately granted 
the motion.212 O'Malley "stated his objection to that ruling," and 
"[h]aving preserved his rights, ... waived his jury claim and ... 
proceeded before the judge, who found him guilty as charged."213 
For Justice Greaney, finding "that the 'threats of force [made 
against the defendant] ... [were] not present, immediate or im­
pending and ... such in nature as to induce a well-founded fear of 
death or at least serious bodily injury'" constituted the first of the 
trial court's two major missteps.214 The second involved its deter­
mination that the defendant had other options besides escaping.215 
Given these judicial errors, and the Commonwealth's failure to 
comply "with the explicit requirements of Mass.R.Crim.P. 
13(a),"216 the decision to overturn the trial court's in limine ruling 
now seems hardly surprising.217 What makes the opinion notewor­
210. Id 
211. Id. at 836. 
212. Id. The trial court ruled: 
(1) that the "threats of force [made against the defendant] ... [were] not 
present, immediate or impending and ... such in nature as to induce a well­
founded fear of death or at least serious bodily injury;" and (2) that the evi­
dence did not show that "there was no reasonable opportunity to avoid the 
situation without ... [escaping]." 
Id. at 835. 
213. Id. at 833. 
214. Id. at 835 (recounting the "long history of threats on the defendant's life; a 
recent threat of death 'if he returned to Concord;' a prior attempt to kill him; and 
another attack following his return to Concord"). 
215. Id. (discussing evidence which tended to show "the defendant made a 'com­
plaint to the authorities,' that it was 'futile,' and that he was, in fact, prevented from 
complaining further"). 
216. Id. at 836. According to Rule 13(a), a pretrial motion "shall be in writing," 
and "shall state the grounds on which it is based and shall include in separately num­
bered paragraphs all reasons ... which shall be set forth with particularity." Id. at 836 
n.9. 
217. That being said, O'Malley was decided before the state's highest court had 
"formally recognize[d] the doctrine of necessity as a defense in [the prison escape] con­
text." Id. at 835 n.7. Notwithstanding the various factors which now seem to make 
O'Malley "a proper case" to "apply the [necessity] doctrine," Commonwealth v. Thur­
ber, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (Mass. 1981), it bears noting that Justice Greaney took Mas­
sachusetts courts into uncharted waters. For the view that decisions like O'Malley were 
motivated by a "hope that recognition of the defense in penal settings might embarrass 
correctional officials and encourage them to improve conditions," see Matthew Lipp­
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thy is the dicta that followed. 
Justice Greaney commenced what he called an "unnecessary" 
discussion of "the defendant's broader argument" by invoking 
O'Malley's fundamental right to assert a defense in accordance with 
his conception of the facts.2IB Motions in limine used to gauge the 
adequacy of a defendant's case, he opined, were incompatible with 
that notion.219 For Justice Greaney, the suitable aim of the pretrial 
motion was "to prevent irrelevant ... or prejudicial matters from 
being admitted in evidence,"22o and rarely could it be "irrelevant or 
prejudicial to allow a defendant to tell his story to the jury."221 
Prosecutors had a duty, Justice Greaney continued, to employ 
the motion in limine "as a rifle and not as a shotgun."222 Permitting 
the Commonwealth to "choke off a valid defense in a criminal ac­
tion, or to 'knock out' the entirety of the evidence supporting a 
defense before it can be heard by the jury," would turn "a criminal 
trial by jury ... into a trial by motion, with the possible effect of 
directing a verdict against the defendant. "223 Thus, Justice Greaney 
concluded, "[i]n the usual case ... it is far more prudent for the 
judge to follow the traditional, and constitutionally sounder, course 
of waiting until all the evidence has been introduced at trial before 
ruling on its sufficiency to raise a proffered defense. "224 
C. Commonwealth v. Hood 
On December 21, 1981, three and a half months before the 
Brugmann decision, four individuals were arrested for refusing to 
leave the outdoor courtyard of Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, 
Inc. (Draper) where they had been passing out leaflets that "advo­
man, Towards a Recognition of the Necessity Defense for Political Protestors, 48 WASH. 
& LEE L. REv. 235, 244 (1991) [hereinafter Lippman, Towards a Recognition]; Matthew 
Lippman, The Necessity Defense and Political Protest, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 317, 326 (1990) 
[hereinafter Lippman, Political Protest]. 
218. O'Malley, 439 N.E.2d at 837. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 385 Mass. 497, 500 n.2 (1981». 
221. Id. at 838. Cognizant, perhaps, that his words could be taken as a direct 
repudiation of his Brugmann opinion, Justice Greaney sought to distinguish the two 
cases. Brugmann, he explained in a footnote, "involved only ... the sufficiency of the 
evidence." Id. at 838 n.ll. It did not require the court to decide "whether sufficiency 
would more properly be assessed at the close of all the evidence." Id. 
222. Id. at 838 (quoting Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Assn., 183 N.W.2d 198, 
201 (Iowa 1971». 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
2005] THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 331 

cated nonviolence as a means to avert nuclear war. "225 Prior to 
their trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine asking the court 
to exclude "evidence consist[ing] of the defendants' reason for be­
ing upon the premises alleged to have been trespassed, to wit: [dis­
tributing leaflets], and the content of said leaflets."226 In response, 
one of the pro se defendants read a short statement explaining the 
group's religious motivations,227 and the judge granted the Com­
monwealth's motion.228 
After outlining the defendants' argument,229 the Hood court 
summarized the holdings of Averill and Brugmann,230 then analo­
gized State v. Marley 231-a Hawaii Supreme Court decision which 
held the necessity defense unavailable for defendants charged with 
trespassing on the premises of another weapons manufacturer.232 
According to Hood, the soundness of the Marley court's reasoning 
rested on its recognition of available legal alternatives, the lack of 
imminent danger, and the absence of a reasonable belief that the 
defendants' actions might avoid the alleged harm.233 
Holding that the four defendants had no reason to believe 
passing out literature opposing the construction of nuclear weapons 
would "abate the alleged danger directiy,"234 the Hood court com­
pared them to the activists in Averill, whose only stated intention 
was to influence "the general public ... through the news of their 
225. Commonwealth v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Mass. 1983). 
226. Id. at 191. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. The in limine ruling prompted one defendant to ask whether "we may 
not speak about our reasons for going to Draper during our trial." Id. 
229. In their brief, the defendants indicated their intention to use the necessity 
defense to show "what United States weapons policy is ... and the imminent harm 
posed by the weapons, as well as the [role] of Draper Laboratory in [its] implementa­
tion and effectuation." Id. at 195. The defendants also claimed "their convictions vio­
lated their rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and arts. 1, 16, and 19 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and their right to defend their lives and liber­
ties under art. 1." Id. at 191. In addition, they raised the "nonconstitutional claim that 
they had an implied license to enter the Draper premises," and asserted that "the jury 
foreman's statement shows that they were not found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. at 193, 197. 
230. Although Hood did not explicitly adopt Brugmann's four-prong test, Com­
monwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-82 (1990), subsequently held that quot­
ing the test in full had that effect. 
231. 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973). 
232. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 195. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 196. 
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arrest."235 Assuming arguendo that the government's weapons pol­
icy constituted a "clear and imminent danger," the court quoted 
Averill for the proposition that "publicity designed to marshal pub­
lic opinion could not extinguish an immediate peril ...."236 "Other 
[legal] avenues were available," the court concluded, "including use 
of publicity media, distribution of literature at an appropriate site, 
and participation in the political process."237 
Of course, ruling that the defendants failed to pass the 
Brugmann test did not require the court to uphold the motion 
judge's in limine decision.238 If, at the conclusion of the trial, the 
defendants' hypothesis of necessity lacked sufficient support, the 
judge could have taken the O'Malley approach and simply declined 
to instruct on it.239 Instead, by pursuing the path it did, the trial 
court "prevented even the introduction of evidence in support of 
the competing harms defense."24o 
Rather than ignore O'Malley, Hood chose to mitigate the 
lower court's conclusions. Whereas O'Malley asserted that "it is far 
more prudent"241 for judges to deny broad prosecutorial pre-trial 
motions, Hood suggested only that "[i]t is, perhaps, "more pru­
dent"242 to do so. Ultimately, because the necessity defense "was 
inapplicable to the defendants' actions," the court determined, 
"they were not prejudiced by their inability to present their evi­
dence to the jury."243 
235. Id. at 195 (quoting Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1981». 
236. Id. (quoting Averill, 423 N.E.2d at 7-8). See also Marley, 509 P.2d at 1109 
(noting that "[u]nder any possible set of hypotheses, defendants could foresee that their 
actions would fail"). 
237. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 196. See also Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453, 
457 (Mass. 1993) (citing Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 458 N.E.2d 734 (1983); MASS. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 19) ("Citizens who disagree with the Legislature's determination of 
policy are not without remedies" including "the popular initiative ...."). 
238. That being said, the Hood court could have disregarded the Brugmann test 
and affirmed the Blodgett court's conclusion that "drawing any exact line of distinction 
as to the measures which such necessary defence would warrant [WOUld] ... perhaps ... 
be [im]practicable; because it must depend much on the circumstances of each case." 
Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56, 84 (1846). 
239. See supra Part III.B. 
240. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 196. 
241. Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 439 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) 
(emphasis added). 
242. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 197 (quoting O'Malley, 439 N.E. 2d at 838) (emphasis 
added). 
243. [d. 
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D. Aftermath 
Hood, in effect, sounded a death knell for competing harms 
claims in Massachusetts cases involving civil disobedience. Al­
though the court concluded its opinion by cautioning against al­
lowing motions that preclude potential defense evidence,244 this do­
as-I-say-not-as-I-do advice has rarely been heeded,245 and judges 
who bar evidence of necessity have invariably had their rulings 
affirmed.246 
IV. CRITIQUING CROWE 
Decisions to keep evidence of necessity from juries in civil dis­
obedience cases have provoked considerable controversy and schol­
arship.247 Among commentators who condemn Crowe-like 
244. Id. at n.5. 
245. For two instances when the advice was heeded, see PL 426/25.14, Massachu­
setts v. Schaeffer-Duffy (Worcester Dist. Ct. 1989); PL 187/25.9, and Massachusetts v. 
Carter, No. 86-45 CR 7475 (Hampshire Dist. Ct. 1987). 
246. See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453, 456 (Mass. 1993) (holding that 
defendants who operated an illegal needle exchange program to combat the spread of 
AIDS "did not show that the danger they sought to avoid was clear and imminent, 
rather than debatable or speculative"); Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741, 
745 (Mass. 1991) (disallowing defendant to assert medical necessity defense based on 
the fact that the "alleviation of the defendant's medical symptoms ... would not clearly 
and significantly outweigh the potential harm to the public were we to declare that the 
defendant's cultivation of marihuana and its use for his medicinal purposes may not be 
punishable"). In Commonwealth v. Brogan, 612 N.E.2d 656, 656 (Mass. 1993), the 
court affirmed the allowance of a motion in limine to bar evidence of necessity in con­
junction with a defendant's violation of a court order prohibiting him from 
a. trespassing on, blocking, or in any way obstructing access (either ingress or 
egress) to any facility in the Commonwealth which provides abortion counsel­
ling or services, and b. physically restraining or obstructing or committing any 
acts of force or violence against persons entering, leaving, working at or seek­
ing to obtain services from any facility in the Commonwealth which provides 
abortion counselling or services .... 
Id. 
247. In addition to those Articles, Notes, and Comments previously cited, see 
Patrick G. Senftle, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, 32 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 523,534-40 (1987-88); Joel H. Levitin, Note, Putting the Government on 
Trial: The Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1221 (1987); 
Tammy A. Tierney, Note, Civil Disobedience as the Lesser Evil, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 
961 (1988); James L. Cavallaro, Casenote, The Demise of the Poltical Necessity Defense: 
Indirect Civil Disobedience and United States v. Schoon, 81 CAL. L. REv. 351 (1993); 
Arlene D. Boxerman, Comment, The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion Clinic 
Protestors, 81 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1990). Not surprisingly, defenders of 
the present jurisprudence find themselves in the minority. While there are, no doubt, 
numerous supporters of the status quo who have not seen the need to become its de­
fender, it is perhaps noteworthy that several of the most vigorous defenders seem to 
predicate their defense, at least partly, on the impact a contrary rule might have, not on 
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outcomes, some accept the articulated elements of the defense and 
quarrel with their application,248 while others advocate for an en­
tirely different approach.249 This next section will present summa­
ries of these diverse camps and demonstrate how Crowe might have 
been analyzed and decided differently. 
A. Reconsideration 
1. Summary 
Pleas for reconsideration250 presume that political protestors 
generally satisfy the threshold issue by choosing the lesser of two 
evils.251 Such pleas posit that inquiries into the imminence element 
should ask no more than the likelihood of the potential harm's oc­
society or the rule of law, but on the institution of civil disobedience. For example, one 
commentator claims the competing harms defense 
has no role to play in a strategy of civil disobedience. The point of civil diso­
bedience is to force a society to recognize the contradiction of using a system 
of justice to defend an unjust institution. If the person practicing civil disobe­
dience is set free not because the offensive institution has been removed but 
because the system of justice has made an exception, then the contradiction 
remains hidden, and the object of the protest is lost. 
Wride, supra note 96, at 1094. See also Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 52, at 1200 
(warning that those who attempt to justify their actions may compromise "the legiti­
macy of traditional civil disobedience"). But see Elliot C. Rothenberg, The "Necessity" 
to Restrict Appeals to Judicial Prejudice, 21 NEW ENG. L. REv. 581, 582 (1985-86) 
("[D]efendants who break the law to propagandize their various public policy views, 
which have previously been rejected through the democratic political process, should 
not then be afforded the opportunity to use the court system to advance their political 
ideologies."); Diana P. Nowezki, Note, "Justified" Nuclear and Abortion Clinic Protest: 
A Kantian Theory of Jurisprudence, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 729 (1985-86) (using 
Immanuel Kant's "Categorical Imperative" to demonstrate "why the courts must be 
conservative in allowing recourse to the defense"). 
248. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 5, at 56 (suggesting "a straight-forward method 
of analyzing and applying the necessity defense [elements] in civil disobedience cases"). 
249. See, e.g., Loesch, supra note 52, at 1099 (claiming the requirements of 
Brugmann-type formulas "are too strict, the standards too narrow, for a necessity de­
fense to answer to the moral conflict faced by some dissenters of conscience"). 
250. I use the term "reconsideration" rather than "reconstruction," "reinterpreta­
tion," or "reformation" in deference to Professor Matthew Lippman, a dogged advo­
cate for the rights of political protestors, who has authored no less than three articles 
containing sections entitled, "The Necessity Defense Reconsidered." See Lippman, To­
wards a Recognition, supra note 217, at 247; Lippman, Political Protest, supra note 217, 
at 343; Matthew Lippman, Reflections on Non-Violent Resistance and the Necessity De­
fense, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 277, 300 (1989). 
251. Indeed, bec;mse "dangers such as the harm of a foreign war ... [are] gener­
ally considered to outweigh the harm of a trespass," Cavallaro, supra note 247, at 357, 
arguments for reconstruction often devote little attention to the relatively "easy task" 
of demonstrating that the harm civil disobedients "sought to avert outweighs the harm 
of their protest activities." Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 52, at 1182. 
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currence;252 they suggest that courts, called upon to evaluate the 
reasonable expectations of activists, should do so cognizant of "the 
fact that acts of nonviolent protest historically have served as a cat­
alyst for social change";253 they urge judges to think critically about 
the effectiveness of the legal avenues ostensibly available to 
marginalized groups,254 and; they contend that legislative preclu­
sion be limited to instances "when the law has dealt explicitly with 
the specific situation that presents the choice of evil ... [and only 
where] the legislature has itself canvassed and determined what the 
choice [ of evils] shall be. "255 
2. Crowe Reconsidered 
Applying this conception of the necessity defense to Crowe, it 
seems clear that the harm of the war the defendants sought to avoid 
"significantly exceeds"256 the harm of "preventing several dozen 
people from getting to work on time."257 Likewise, the state's ab­
sence of imminence claim is belied by the fact that the danger the 
defendants sought to abate actually came to pass.258 
252. Senftle, supra note 247, at 535 (noting the necessity defense "carries a 
broader definition of the term imminent than its common definition"). According to 
one widely cited argument for reconsideration, making "imminence" synonymous with 
"immediacy" undermines the internal consistency of the defense by placing "the actor 
in a catch-22 situation; the longer the actor waits in order to satisfy the immediacy 
requirement, the less likely her action reasonably can be expected effectively to avert 
the harm, thus failing to satisfy another element of the defense." Schulkind, supra note 
50, at 97. 
253. Lippman, Political Protest, supra note 217,'at 347. 
254. THE ZINN READER, supra note 50, at 385 (suggesting "the much-praised 
'proper channels' are not channels at all, but mazes, into which we are invited, like 
experimental animals, to get lost"). 
255. Model Penal Code § 3.02 commentary at 6 (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958). 
256. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 422 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
But see Levitin, supra note 247, at 1221-22 (There are "certain difficulties with the 
Brugmann court's formulation" including the assertion that "the harm sought to be 
avoided must 'significantly' exceed that resulting from the action taken. Merely tipping 
the scale, however, is sufficient under many formulations."). 
257. Doerner, supra note 5. 
258. The Commonwealth's motion concedes as much when it states that the "ac­
tual risk" was "two months away." Commonwealth's Motion, supra note 15, at 2. The 
state's first alternative argument that "none of the defendants faced personal harm" or 
"felt any degree of physical danger," id., appears improperly to ignore the finding of 
Commonwealth v. O'Kane, 760 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), that the immi­
nent danger element encompasses those harms "threatening the defendant or a third 
person." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Weaver, 511 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1987». Assum­
ing arguendo that this element did compel defendants to act in the face of personal 
danger, what could be more dangerous to them, the defendants might ask, than having 
their government invade a country purported to possess weapons of mass destruction? 
See Kathleen T. Rhem, Rumsfeld Dismisses Iraqi Claims of Innocence Regarding 
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More problematic for the Crowe defendants is the state's asser­
tion that their conduct could not possibly "have stopped the 
war."259 According to the Commonwealth: 
The disruption of Westover Air Reserve base that January morn­
ing would have had no measurable impact on the incipient war 
effort. Preparing for an armed conflict of this size is a national 
and global undertaking. The concept that the burden of fighting 
a war in Iraq rests upon uninterrupted access to a single base in 
Western Massachusetts is not credible.260 
Are the lessons of history,261 procedural posture,262 and the 
power of collective action263 enough to overcome the prosecution's 
argument? Assuming they are, a critical look at the remaining ele­
ments seems to favor the defendants. While Crowe and her com­
rades could "demonstrate good faith efforts to remedy legally the 
harm being challenged,"264 the state would be hard-pressed to 
prove that another letter to the editor or phone call to a politician 
would have been effective.265 
Finally, notwithstanding the Commonwealth's invocation of 
the Congressional resolution authorizing force against Iraq,266 it ap-
WMDs, Nov. 14, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/newslNov2002/n1114 
2002_200211141.html (quoting the Defense Secretary's assertion that "they do have 
weapons of mass destruction"). The state's second alternative argument that allega­
tions of imminence are "undercut by the fact that they chose the date of their protest 
arbitrarily" is itself undercut the arbitrary nature of some of history's most famous acts 
of civil disobedience. See, e.g., infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text. 
259. Commonwealth's Motion, supra note 15, at 3. 
260. Id. 
261. See supra notes 10-12 and Part LB. 
262. "Insufficiency as a matter of law is a stringent standard, and the law gener­
ally favors submitting defenses to the jury." Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 52, at 
1178 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979». 
263. See Doerner, supra note 5 ("With respect to expectations, the point was 
made that 20 went to Westover on January 15. On February 15, 10-million demon­
strated in cities around the world. By March 22 we numbered 2,000 at the same West­
over gate. "). 
264. Lippman, Towards a Recognition, supra note 217, at 247. See also supra 
notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
265. See Commonwealth v. McCambridge, 690 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998). In McCambridge, the prosecution argued that a defendant who shot an armed 
antagonist "had an effective legal alternative, namely to wrestle the gun" away. Id. 
However, the court concluded that "[b]ased on the defendant's evidence, there was no 
assurance that an attempt to take the gun away ... would have been effective ...." Id. 
Based on the Crowe defendants' evidence, there was no assurance that further attempts 
to influence foreign policy makers would have been effective. 
266. Commonwealth's Motion, supra note 15, at 3-4 (citing "Authorization for 
Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 
1498 (2002». 
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pears that legislative preclusion in the Commonwealth is a non-is­
sue. As a 1997 appellate court decision pointed out: "No 
Massachusetts court has yet precluded the [necessity] defense based 
on a determination that the Legislature has statutorily ruled it 
out."267 
3. Reconsidering Reconsideration 
For those who believe defendants like Frances Crowe deserve 
the chance to justify their conduct in the presence of juries, asking 
courts to "interpret the language of the test simply and reason a­
bly"268 constitutes a considerable risk. As one commentator sym­
pathetic to civil disobedients has noted: 
When citizens protest a policy or law by engaging in demonstra­
tions that violate a trespass statute, they do not expect that their 
action, by itself, will cause the reform of the law to which they 
object. They will, therefore, only very rarely meet the require­
ment that a rational person could have concluded that their diso­
bedient action by itself would result in the change for which they 
hope.269 
Those who urge reconsideration might think it sensible to 
deem the claim's act requirement "satisfied by public, nonviolent 
acts of protest, reasonably calculated to direct public attention to a 
situation reasonably perceived to pose a significant social harm."270 
However, if one applies the "fundamental canon of statutory con­
struction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be inter­
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
267. Commonwealth v. Lora, 681 N.E.2d 876,879 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). Ac­
cording to the Lora court, 
where the statute provides no clear guidance, judges should prevent jurors 
from engaging in an exercise of legislative interpretation. A judge should ei­
ther omit the fourth element from the charge, or inform the jury that the Leg­
islature has left the defense available, leaving the jury to decide whether the 
evidence satisfies the first three elements so as to justify the defendant's viola­
tion of the law. 
Id. at 880. Seven years after this decision, there is no consensus on its impact. Whereas 
the majority of courts continue to include the element, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
O'Kane, 760 N.E.2d 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Commonwealth v. Janvin, 690 N.E.2d 
470 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951 (Mass. 1998), at 
least one appellate court has followed Lora's lead by eliminating it from the charge. See 
Commonwealth v. Ben B., 796 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
268. Quigley, supra note 5, at 50. 
269. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1099. 
270. Lippman, International Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra note 50, at 
52. 
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meaning,"271 then such an indirect approach cannot, by definition, 
be "the direct cause of abating the danger."272 
Given the central role Westover Air Force base plays in trans­
porting supplies to the Middle East,273 the Crowe defendants are 
perhaps better positioned than most protestors to claim their con­
duct could have averted a complex harm.274 Nonetheless, a success­
ful challenge to the trial court's ruling appears unlikely. At the 
appellate level, nothing, it seems, succeeds like success. To date, 
the only Massachusetts defendants who have satisfied this element 
are those whose actions actually did abate the danger.275 
B. Auxiliary Approaches 
Perhaps the most creative of proposed solutions to the motion 
in limine quandary are those which proffer alternate modes of anal­
ysis to supplement or supplant traditional necessity tests. For ex­
ample, one student commentator, after analyzing choice of evil 
cases from across the country,276 suggests a modification of Judge 
Learned Hand's famous negligence formula277 might best decide 
271. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
272. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
273. Doerner, supra note 5 (noting the defendants' contention during the motion 
hearing that "more than 50% of all Mideast material (tanks, helicopters, APCs) is 
transshipped from Westover ..."). 
274. Of course, the Crowe defendants could also claim that their aim was not to 
stop the impending war. Cognizant of the conversion of Lt. Donald Dawson, see supra 
notes 12-14 and accompanying text, they could state that their more modest objective 
was to stop individual soldiers at Westover from participating in it. 
275. See, e.g., Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 462; Commonwealth v. McCambridge, 
690 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). But see Commonwealth v. Weaver, 511 
N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1987). Although the defendant's unlawful possession of a firearm 
effectively abated a clear and imminent danger by taking the weapon from someone 
who had just used it to shoot a defenseless victim, the court was unwilling to infer that 
the defendant consciously opted for the lesser of two evils. Id. at 547-48. 
276. Levitin, supra note 247, at 1228-38 (discussing State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 
1000 (Vt. 1979); State v. Greene, 623 P.2d 933 (Kan. 1981); State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 
855 (N.H. 1978); Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 457; In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44 
(1985); People v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 
F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Hubbard, 320 N.W.2d 294 (1982)). In addition, Levi­
tin offers a comparison of various necessity codifications. Id. at 1238-51 (discussing N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No.8, 
1958); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501, 503 (Purdon 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21­
3209(1) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 38 § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972)). 
277. Judge Hand first articulated his formula in United States v. Carroll Towing, 
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the probability [of harm] be called P; the [gravity 
of the resulting] injury L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends 
on whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."). 
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competing harms claims.278 This section will focus on the reasoning 
and potential implications of two other inventive approaches: Mat­
thew Loesch's call to amend the Model Penal Code "to admit in 
some limited circumstances, testimony relevant to ... motive,"279 
and the seemingly modest proposal of Professor John Rockwell 
Snowden that all defendants "be able to tell their stories and ask 
the judge or jury to find them not guilty, without regard to prede­
termined rules, elements, and the like. "280 
1. Countenancing Extraordinary Crime 
a. Why Civil Disobedients Deserve Better 
At the heart of Martin Loesch's proposition is the belief that 
"those citizens who engage in civil disobedience are different from 
ordinary criminals."281 Unlike the typical deviant who "does what 
she does out of self-interest and in violation of the respect citizens 
are required to show other persons and their interests,"282 the civil 
disobedient seeks "not only to resolve the conflict between conflict­
ing moral and legal obligations, but also to right what she perceives 
as an unjust political order."283 Convinced these distinctions 
"should be accounted for in our criminallaw,"284 Loesch advocates 
amending the Model Penal Code to include a "Civil Disobedience 
Justification."285 This amendment would permit evidence describ­
278. In Levitin's formula "A = the gravity of the harm of the action taken by the 
defendant; H = the gravity of the harm that might result from no action; and p = the 
probability that H will occur." Levitin, supra note 247, at 1253. According to Levitin, 
since "a peaceful trespass is fairly unobtrusive ... it would not be very difficult for the 
defendants committing such a crime to present necessity evidence to a jury." Id. at 
1254. "Conversely ... [c]rimes involving injury to people would require the greatest 
burden of proof." Id. 
279. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1070. Although Loesch also advocates changing 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, this article will only address his proposed "additions to 
the Model Penal Code," which the author describes as "far more important." Id. at 
1108. 
280. John Rockwell Snowden, The Justification Story: Law as Integrity and Devia­
tionist Doctrine, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 49, 67 (1991). 
281. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1094. 
282. Id. at 1095. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Apparently, Loesch believes the widespread acceptance of the Model Penal 
Code makes amending it the best (and quickest) way to effect the most change. See id. 
at 1108-09 ("Jurisdictions which have adopted the model provisions would have to en­
act the amendments I propose; those uurisdictions like Massachusetts] which have not 
yet adopted the uniform standards would have to make the appropriate conversions to 
their own system."). For a contrary view on how to "alter the existing legal landscape," 
see Larry Cata Backer, Measuring the Penetration of Outsider Scholarship into the 
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ing the considerations which prompted the actors to break the law, 
provided they could prove: (1) their action was "nonviolent in char­
acter"; (2) their action was "specifically limited and narrowly tai­
lored to suit the character of the conflict"; (3) they had previously 
pursued "all reasonable legal alternatives"; (4) they reasonably per­
ceived a conflict between their legal and moral obligations; and (5) 
that vindicating their moral belief "substantially outweighs the gov­
ernmental interest in prohibiting the conduct at issue."286 
The civil disobedient capable of satisfying this criteria, Loesch 
believes, deserves the right "to do what they all want to do: make 
arguments to the jury about why they did what they did."287 
b. Implications for Crowe 
By substituting a nonviolence requirement for the most oner­
ous of the Brugmann elements-the reasonable expectation that 
the illegal action "will be effective as the direct cause of abating the 
danger"288-Loesch improves the Crowe defendants' chances of 
placing their conduct in its social context. While replacing the easy­
to-satisfy "no legislative preclusion"289 prong with a requirement 
that acts be suitably "tailored" is less helpful; the Crowe defendants 
did in fact carry out their protest in clothing "tailored to suit the 
character of the conflict. "290 Hence, one suspects their claim would 
survive this new inquiry as well. 
Courts: Indifference, Hostility, Engagement, 33 v.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1180, 1182 
(2000) (citation omitted) (finding that "more state courts, rather than federal courts, are 
listening [to,] and learning [from, radical and progressive scholars]"). According to 
Backer, 
The great hope for the normalization of outsider scholarship within formal 
lawmaking institutions lies with those very concepts of strong federalism that 
were championed by southern intellectuals and anti-Federalists before the 
American Civil War. ... Strong states sometimes serve best the interests of 
outsiders. Federalism works, and has created those few places where the 
voices of "outsiders" can be considered, can change the legal landscape, and 
by so doing, provide a beacon and example for those others who would follow. 
Id. at 1182-83. See also Thomas Geoghegan, Take it to the Blue States: Maybe labor 
should give up on Washington in favor offriendlier terrain, THE NATION, Nov. 29, 2004, 
at 14 (suggesting that the labor movement "[u]se state law as much as possible to set up 
the kind of social democracy we would like to see for the country as a whole"). 
286. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1109. 
287. Id. at 1104. Loesch would restrict this evidence "to the testimony of the 
actor[s], relevant experts, and documentary evidence, describing: (a) the legitimacy and 
substance of the belief at issue, and (b) the process by which the actor[s] arrived at the 
decision to violate the law." Id. at 1110. 
288. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
289. Id. 
290. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1109. 
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More troublesome is Loesch's modification to the "legal alter­
natives" element. By compelling the pursuit of "all reasonable legal 
alternatives" Loesch actually exacerbates the burden for activists 
typically asked to exhaust only those alternatives that "will be effec­
tive."291 While this more stringent standard increases the likeli­
hood that "courts in hindsight" will find, and fixate upon, "just one 
more alternative,"292 the Crowe defendants could probably avoid 
this result by focusing on the four corners of the Commonwealth's 
motion, which inexplicably neglects this element.293 Given the ex­
plicit requirement that "all reasons" for a motion in limine "be in 
writing,"294 the Commonwealth should be foreclosed from making 
legal roads not taken an issue on appeal. 
The final two elements of Loesch's proposed affirmative de­
fense involve subjective and objective evaluations of the defend­
ants' beliefs. Since there is little doubt the Crowe defendants 
reasonably believed that obeying the law conflicted with their duty 
to stop an unjust war, telling a jury "why they did what they did" 
would depend on whether the court felt their quest for peace sub­
stantially outweighed the state's interest in keeping a road clear. 
While this formulation fails to rectify the onus Brugmann places on 
defendants by making them do more than merely tip the scale,295 
balancing the prevention of carnage with the prevention of inconve­
nience should favor the defendants. 
The Commonwealth's acceptance of this proposal would, 
therefore, probably give the Crowe defendants the benefits Loesch 
sought to bestow.296 The more interesting question is whether they 
would choose to accept them. 
c. Implications for the Marketplace of Ideas 
At the close of Crowe's in limine hearing, the Commonwealth 
informed the court "how refreshing it was to have [such atypical] 
291. As difficult as it has been for civil disobedients to demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation in the effectiveness of their action, it has been comparatively easy to high­
light the futile prospects of legal avenues not explored. But see Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 
at 462 (concluding the defendants did not satisfy the legal alternatives element). 
292. Matthew Lippman, Liberating the Law: The Jurisprudence of Civil Disobedi­
ence and Resistance, 2 SAN DIEGO Jus. J. 299, 382 n.489 (1994) (citation omitted). 
293. See Commonwealth's Motion, supra note 15. 
294. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
295. Brugmann, 422 N.E.2d at 460. 
296. See Loesch, supra note 52, at 1071 (evincing a desire to give "the jury or 
judge the ability to assess the culpability of the [civil disobedient] in light of those char­
acteristics which distinguish her from an ordinary criminal"). 
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defendants. "297 Rather than accept the compliment, one of the de­
fendants responded by asserting solidarity with "the socially and ec­
onomically disadvantaged who [almost always] appeared opposite 
[the prosecutor]."298 Calling these ordinary criminals "political 
prisoners," he told the court that they too "were part of [their] 
overall concern. "299 
This refusal, by the Crowe defendants, to accept the notion 
that they "are different from ordinary criminals" evinced an under­
standing that crime, in our "unjust political order," is "intimately 
associated with race."300 According to Professor Kenneth Nunn, 
"[c]rime sets the borders of race" providing "content to the image" 
of racial outsiders.301 For criminal law theorist Dorothy Roberts, 
"race does more than predict a person's propensity for committing 
neutrally defined offenses . . . . Crime is actually constructed ac­
cording to race."302 While the truth of these observations is no­
where more evident than in the current drug war,303 the symbiotic 
relationship between crime and race304 means people of color "will 
constitute 'the usual suspects' no matter what the social 
concern."305 
Ultimately, Loesch's failure to grapple with crime as a social 
construction causes him to forward a proposal that "challenge[s] 
the impact of [large-scale injustices] on more privileged popUlations 
297. Posting of Carl Doerner, cdoerner@surfglobal.net, to AriseAction@yahoo 
groups.com (Apr. 27, 2003) (copy on file with author). Such courtroom praise is not 
uncommon. See Sacha Pfeiffer, Raytheon protestors get one year ofprobation, THE Bos­
TON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1999, at B3, available at 1999 WL 6051781 ('''These [protestors] 
are not villains,' [Assistant District Attorney Murat] Erkan said, 'They believe they are 
doing something right ...."'); Luke Ryan, Disturbing the Peace, LEX BREVIS, Sept. 
2003, available at http://assets.wnec.eduJ33/september2003.pdf (documenting the au­
thor's own courtroom experience after engaging in civil disobedience). 
298. Doerner, supra note 297. 
299. Id. It bears noting here that all the Crowe defendants are white. 
300. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why 
the "War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 433 
(2002). See also Anthony Paul Farley, Sadomasochism and the Colorline: Reflections on 
the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY 69 (Devon 
W. Carbado ed., 1999) ("[T]the black criminal is produced ... in ghetto after ghetto 
after ghetto."). 
30l. Nunn, supra note 300, at 433. 
302. Id. at 434 (quoting Dorothy Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 
TuL. L. REV. 1945, 1954 (1993». 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 433 ("[R]ace and crime share the same conceptual space within the 
discourse of social formation. They are both outside of the center, and the demarcation 
of one lends itself to the social construction of the other. "). 
305. Id. at 445. 
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while ignoring or even justifying [their] impact on people of color 
and immigrants."306 Because race and "class [often] determine who 
is able ... to commit civil disobedience, "307 crimes of conscience 
frequently lead to "movement privilege, with activists who can af­
ford to tally arrest counts granted subsequently more political 
[clout]."308 By further privileging this white resistance method of 
choice,309 Loesch threatens to erect a "major barrier to multiracial, 
anti-racist movement building. "310 For civil disobedients conscious 
of the coherence of means and ends,311 a defense predicated upon 
racial and socio-economic inequality might prove philosophically 
unappealing.312 Even pragmatic disobedients anxious to inject their 
ideas into the marketplace might be reluctant to take advantage of 
Loesch's proposal should doing so seem destined to delay the emer­
gence of a new "multiracial, multinational, multilingual and multi­
class mainstream. "313 For astute activists, the current image of ordi­
nary criminals as "cinematic villains" not only "severs our common 
306. Steve Bloom et aI., An Open Letter to Activists Concerning Racism in the 
Anti-War Movement, available at http://www.ippn.orglarticle.php?ID=sprnews03j.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
307. The War Resisters League, Confronting Classism, in HANDBOOK FOR NON­
VIOLENT ACTION, (citing the work of Donna Warnock and Laura Briggs), available at 
httpll:www.revolution.gq.nu/classism.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
308. Id. 
309. According to activist Helen Luu, 
the clearest example [of white privilege in the social justice movement] may be 
the (usually sole) focus on direct action, which almost always means direct 
police confrontation .... [T]he emphasis on this method alone often works to 
exclude people of colour because what is not being taken into account is the 
relationship between the racist (in) justice system and people of colour. 
As quoted in Chris Crass, Confronting the Democratic National Convention and Work­
ing to Build a People's Movement for Justice, available at http://infoshop.orglrants/crass_ 
reflects.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2oo4). 
310. Id. 
311. See KING, supra note 65, at 255 ("[E]nds are not cut off from means, because 
means represent the ideal in the making, and the end in process ...."). While this 
attitude has been perhaps most prevalent in various quests for peace, see, e.g., id. (criti­
cizing the "conquerors of old who came killing in pursuit of peace"), it can be found in 
other movements as well. See Shelley Douglass, A World Where Abortion is Unthink
able, in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 59, at 341. 
[T]here's Biblical quotation that goes like this-"If you can't love your 
brother, whom you have seen, how can you love God whom you have not 
seen?" If we can't love our sisters, whom we have seen, how can we love their 
children, whom we have not seen? It seems to me that we start by learning 
how to love those we can see. 
Id. 
312. See KING, supra note 65, at 290 ("Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere. "). 
313. Bloom et aI., supra note 306. 
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bond of humanity,"314 it exemplifies "the whole tradition of popular 
control ... to keep people isolated."315 Isolation, they know, is 
what has kept "US peace and anti-war groups[,] ... primarily com­
posed of, and overwhelmingly led by, older white middle-class peo­
ple,"316 from grasping that "for most people in the world, peace is 
war-a daily battle against hunger, thirst, and the violation of their 
dignity."317 In order to assert solidarity with those presently per­
ceived as "a permanent caste of moral inferiors,"318 many civil dis­
obedients might voluntarily confine themselves to legal options 
universally available. By doing so, they would minimize the impact 
of Loesch's proposal on the marketplace of ideas. 
Perhaps just as important, Loesch's failure to countenance this 
(or any other) current feature of our unjust political order makes 
the legislative embrace of his proposal extremely unlikely. Pro­
posed reforms, like Loesch's, can only hope to garner the requisite 
support when those in power feel a "political or ideological need to 
restore an image of fairness that has somehow been tarnished."319 
Rather than draw attention to present-day injustice(s), Loesch con­
centrates almost exclusively on "inequities of the past,"320 implies 
future policies could prove problematic, and suggests we be pre­
pared to honor dissent in the event they do.321 By characterizing 
our society as a "'nearly just democracy' ... which, on the whole, 
attempts to realize the requirements of participatory government 
and which supports substantially just institutions,"322 Loesch under­
314. Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality 
and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1019, 1025 (2004). 
315. CHOMSKY, supra note 87, at 202. 
316. Elizabeth (Betita) Martinez, Color in the Anti-War Movement, available at 
http://www.resistinc.orglnewsletter/issues/2003/04/martinez.html(last visited Sept. 29, 
2004). 
317. ARUNDHATI Roy, AN ORDINARY PERSON's GUIDE TO EMPIRE 15-16 (2004); 
see also NGUGI WA THIONG'O, MOVING THE CENTRE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL 
FREEDOMS 117 (1993) (describing the peace poor people experience as "a permanent 
state of war"). 
318. Yankah, supra note 314, at 1028-29. 
319. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma­
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1368 (1988). 
320. Loesch, supra note 52, at 1086. Loesch does cite "Operation Rescue, the 
Plowshares, Act Up, the Sanctuary Movement, Earth First!, and Greenpeace" as suc­
cessors to "The Intercolonial Sons of Liberty, the Underground Railroad, and the Wob­
blies." Id. However, he refrains from detailing, or even stating, what these modem 
groups find so unjust about the present day. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. at 1087 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-12 (1971». Un­
like Loesch, Rawls does seriously question whether "members of subjected minorities" 
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cuts his case for change. If our institutions do not "work substan­
tially to the detriment of a significant portion of the population,"323 
adopting a civil disobedience justification defense hardly appears 
necessary, let alone urgent. 
2. Prying Open the Judicial Ear 
a. Deconstructing Brugmann 
Unlike Loesch, Professor Snowden cannot be accused of pull­
ing any punches. Indeed, many and grave are the faults Snowden 
finds in the justice system in general and the necessity doctrine in 
particular. For starters, he cannot comprehend "why the genre for 
the justification story is so limited."324 Snowden refuses to concede 
any logic to the notion that efforts at exculpation must naturally 
become stories of competing harms.325 "While it may be possible to 
translate any [story] into the genre of necessary choice of a lesser 
evil, just as one may force any story into iambic pentameter," 
Snowden cannot fathom why that should be mandatory.326 "In 
fact," he writes, "it seems unnatural."327 
Snowden next targets key elements of the necessity defense. 
When exactly, he wonders, did Jim Crow become "a clear and im­
minent danger?"328 Did Rosa Parks overlook a duty to make her­
self "aware of existing alternatives and pursue those which [were] 
lawful, or show them to be futile in the circumstances?"329 Because 
the necessity doctrine demands such foolish questions, Snowden 
suggests it cannot "provide concrete, real answers to particular legal 
or social problems."33o 
Ultimately, such indeterminacy appears less troubling for 
Snowden than the manner in which Crowe-type rulings make "se­
have the same political obligations as "the more favored members of society." RAWLS, 
supra note 322, at 376. See also id. at 343 ("Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly 
unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations. It is generally agreed that extorted 
promises are void ab initio. But similarly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a 
kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind."). 
323. Id. 
324. Snowden, supra note 280, at 68. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 69. 
327. Id. 
328. Id.; Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1982). 
329. Snowden, supra note 280, at 69; Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d at 462. 
330. See THOMAS W. SIMON, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE: LAW, POLIT­
ICS, AND PHILOSOPHY 276 (1995) (quoting David Kairys' definition of 
"indeterminacy"). 
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cret the justification stories offered and [deny] their hearing or exis­
tence. "331 Comparing such findings to lack of jurisdiction decisions, 
Snowden claims this "closing of the judicial ear"332 effectively sub­
stitutes "a hierarchal principle of authority in place of an interpreta­
tion of the right. "333 This refusal to "commit to any principle 
beyond secrecy and state power"334 engenders resistance,335 he sub­
mits, and keeps "our law" from being "the best it can be."336 
Finally, after casting Crowe and Brugmann-type rulings as a 
deprivation of the "practical deliberation" that sits at the core of 
our "tradition of civic-republicanism,"337 Snowden assaults the sup­
posed "objectivity" of the necessity elements.338 Constructed to ap­
pear "detached," these rules that seem "to transcend the results in 
particular cases" are founded, he claims, on an "abstract universal­
ity [that] is ideology, pure and simple."339 According to Snowden, 
this process of reification draws attention to "a very few and argua­
bly irrelevant artificial details"340 and creates a legal construct 
which must suppress the humanity of each citizen it impacts.341 
b. The Implications for Crowe 
Unlike the reconsideration approach or the civil disobedience 
justification defense, the judicial acceptance of what Snowden ad­
vocates would guarantee Frances Crowe the right to state her rea­
sons for committing civil disobedience. Simply put, Crowe, like all 
331. Snowden, supra note 280, at 73. 
332. [d. 
333. [d. at 74. 
334. Id. at 75. 
335. [d. ("[S]ecrecy and denial" undermine dissidents' natural inclination to "de­
fer to the superior violence of the state; and next time, the resisters who remain will be 
hardened. "). 
336. Id. at 76. Professor Snowden relies heavily on Ronald Dworkin's notion of 
"law as integrity" as found in LAW'S EMPIRE. See Snowden, supra note 280, at LB. 
337. Snowden, supra note 280, at 78 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self­
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986». 
338. Snowden, supra note 280, at 81. 
339. Id. (quoting Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Es­
say, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1377-78 (1986». Snowden would claim that Brugmann's "offi­
ciallisting of things that are or are not necessary, imminent, alternatives, effective ... 
[is] not indispensably true." [d. His assertion that the competing harms doctrine has 
been "fancied by human will" is not easily refuted in light of the role the Amicus Brief 
of Yankee Atomic seems to have played in its formulation. See supra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
340. Snowden, supra note 280, at 82 (quoting Michael Davis, Critical Jurispru­
dence: An Essay on the Legal Theory of Robert Burt's Taking Care of Strangers, 1981 
WIS. L. REv. 419, 423 (1981». 
341. Snowden, supra note 280, at 82 (quoting Davis, supra note 340, at 421 n.5). 
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defendants, would "be entitled to tell ... her story of justification 
and ask the judge or jury to find ... her not guilty on that basis."342 
c. Implications for the Marketplace of Ideas 
Notwithstanding the benefits Snowden's approach would be­
stow upon the civilly disobedient themselves,343 there is no guaran­
tee that opening the door to justification stories would benefit their 
causes or the marketplace of ideas. "Law narrows. And Law chan­
nels."344 But law also provides a vehicle for messages the public 
might otherwise be unwilling or unable to hear. 
Social science has found that people cannot focus solely on the 
substance of a statemenP45 According to Professor C. Edwin 
Baker, "subconscious repressions, phobias, or desires influence 
people's assimilation of messages ...."346 Factor in "the phenome­
non of cognitive dissonance [which] insulate[ s] individuals from 
messages inconsistent with those perspectives that further their per­
ceived self-interests,"347 and the deck is already stacked against the 
dissident. 
The necessity defense, for all its faults, provides a "structure 
342. Id. at 84-85. 
343. Such benefits would surely include, but by no means be limited to, acquittals. 
See Quigley, supra note 5, at III.B. If Professor Kevin Smith's hypothesis is correct and 
civil disobedience does "help the civil disobedient develop or validate an attitude and a 
feeling of autonomy and self-direction," then further empowerment would seem to flow 
from the opportunity to tell a justification story "instead of passively being at the 
mercies of others." Smith, supra note 48, at 130. 
344. Rhonda Copelon quoted in Martha L. Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers 
and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PrIT. L. REv. 723,732 (1991). See also 
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Schol­
arship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1072 (1989) ("The institutionalized form, the need for 
expert assistance, the individualization of claims, the delay and delay and delay, the 
elaborate ritual, the scalpel of 'relevance,' the limited remedies, all work to channel our 
behavior and mold our perceptions of possibilities."). 
345. Ingber, supra note 25, at 35. 
346. Id. Moreover, 
[n]arrative theory shows that we interpret new stories in terms of the old ones 
we have internalized and now use to judge reality. When new stories deviate 
too drastically from those that form our current understanding, we denounce 
them as false and dangerous .... Language requires an interpretive paradigm, 
a set of shared meanings that a group agrees to attach to words and terms. If 
racism is deeply inscribed in that paradigm-woven into a thousand scripts, 
stories, and roles-one cannot speak out against it without appearing 
incoherent. 
Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis 
of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 871, 882 (1994) 
[hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves]. 
347. Ingber, supra note 25, at 35. 
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for publicizing and debating political issues in the judicial fo­
rum."348 Like iambic pentameter, it may be "unnatural," but at 
least it gives users a chance to be heard. 
As Professor Ingber has pointed out: 
The public tends to focus more on the dissenting message's pack­
aging than on its content precisely because of the dissident's un­
conventional personality, method of communication, and 
terminology. In fact, the public hostility and anxiety created by 
unconventional and disruptive presentations compound the diffi­
culty the audience has in understanding, or even perceiving, the 
intended message. In contrast, orthodox positions generally are 
heard from respected "responsible" individuals in "responsible" 
contexts, thereby increasing their acceptability to the public.349 
Juxtaposed with the familiar legal arguments of respected, re­
sponsible public servants, most justification stories would suffer the 
fate of the hopeless "homespun attempts on public access channels" 
to challenge "the professionally packaged presentations" on com­
mercial television.350 
A second problem with Snowden's proposal is the havoc it 
could wreak in the lives of the disadvantaged.351 For a radical 
scholar writing at the height of the "Abortion Rescue Move­
ment,"352 Snowden appears strangely unaware of the justification 
stories abortion clinic "trespassers"353 were anxious to tell.354 If 
348. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 52, at 1176. See also Lippman, International 
Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra note 50, at 56 ("The rules of evidence ... will 
guarantee the orderly and effective presentation of opposing views.") (emphasis added). 
349. Ingber, supra note 25, at 48. See also Giles Gunn quoted in Martha Minow, 
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10,39 (1987) ("Anyone who deviates from the 
official norm ... anyone who fails to bear a likeness to the Standard Product, is simply 
not viewed as fully human, and then becomes at best invisible, at worst a threat to 
national security. "). 
350. Ingber, supra note 25, at 70. 
351. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic­
tim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2325 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Responsel 
("[Ilnformality and oppression are frequent fellow-travelers."); Richard Delgado, The 
Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-c.L. L. REV. 301, 315 (1987) ("[Sltructureless processes affirmatively increase the 
likelihood of prejudice. "). 
352. Charles E. Rice, Issues Raised by the Abortion Rescue Movement, 23 SUF­
FOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1989). In the twelve years preceding Snowden's article, there were 
"783 incidents of violence ... including 34 bombings, 48 arsons, an additional 40 at­
tempted bombings or arsons, 60 assault and batteries, and 72 death threats." Apel, 
supra note 95, at 55 (citing figures from the National Abortion Federation). 
353. But see Apel, supra note 95, at 54-63 ("[Tlo term the activities of Operation 
Rescue as 'trespass' ignores the facts."). 
354. One can infer how misogynistic these stories might have been by considering 
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courts had suddenly been persuaded by Snowden to abandon the 
legal practice of curtailing responses to an accusation, one wonders 
what kind of courtroom tales might have come from the protestor 
who "punched a pregnant clinic worker in the stomach," causing 
her to miscarry.355 Or the "gunman [who] attacked two abortion 
clinics in the Boston area, killing two [female] receptionists. "356 Or 
the activists who barred a bleeding woman they had cut from enter­
ing a clinic "for treatment of the laceration."357 Although it is fairly 
easy to imagine how the injuries to these victims might have been 
compounded, consistency compels this Note to ask another ques­
tion: what effect would such injuries have on the marketplace of 
ideas? 
For free speech absolutists, the answer appears: none whatso­
ever. Letting the "windes of doctrin" of violent misogynists "loose 
to play upon earth" could cause no societal harm,358 they seem to 
suggest, so long as "[t]ruth be in the field."359 Others scholars are 
not quite so sanguine.360 
According to Professor Robert Schopp, this particular "crime 
the names that people used to describe women associated with abortion clinics, 
"'whore' and 'dyke' being two of the most common." Id. at 56. For a compelling cri­
tique of Operation Rescue tactics by a "pro-life" activist, see Douglass, supra note 31l. 
355. Apel, supra note 95, at 55. 
356. Ledewitz, American Sit-in, supra note 88, at 500 n.3. 
357. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 
264 n.4 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting the victim's original purpose in going to the clinic "was 
not abortion-related"). 
358. But see Ingber, supra note 25, at 7 n.29 (noting defamation law is predicated 
on the idea that falsehood can, and often does, emerge victorious). According to Pro­
fessor Ingber, 
[i]t is unlikely that the dispute over the "power of truth" theory can ever be 
resolved. The critics of the argument generally speak in the short run and the 
supporters say only that truth prevails in the long run. Because there is no 
definition of how long the long run is, however, there is no way either to verify 
or to disprove the thesis that truth ultimately will prevail. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
359. See supra note 30. 
360. See Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 389, 398 (2004) ("Legislative successes of slavery's advocates indicate that they 
were more successful in the antebellum marketplace of ideas than those who opposed 
slavery."); Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 468 (1990) [hereinafter Lawrence, Regulating Racist 
Speech] ("The American marketplace of ideas was founded with the idea of the racial 
inferiority of non-whites as one of its chief commodities, and ever since the market 
opened, racism has remained its most active item in trade."); Delgado & Stefancic, 
Images of the Outsider, supra note 45, at 1281 ("The notion of ideas competing with 
each other, with truth and goodness emerging victorious from the competition, has 
proven seriously deficient when applied to evils, like racism, that are deeply inscribed in 
the culture. "). 
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of conscience" intrudes upon "a competent woman's opportunity to 
exercise her legal right to make reproductive decisions" and thus 
"imputes lesser standing to her in the public sphere. "361 Allowing 
her assailant the right to justify her assault would, in Professor Mari 
Matsuda's eyes, further reduce the victim's ability to have her 
"speech taken seriously."362 To ask that truth and "falsehood" be 
afforded a place to "grapple"363 is not a fair request, Matsuda 
claims, for the tolerance sought is not "borne by the community at 
large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to 
pay."364 
Ultimately, the free-for-all Snowden envisions runs the risk of 
devaluing outsiders and treating them "in a degraded way."365 The 
danger of such ambivalence towards the input and perspectives of 
marginalized populations is the further impoverishment of a mar­
ketplace already lacking in diversity and dominated by elites.366 
361. Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as Jury 
Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2105-06 (1996). 
362. Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 351, at 2376. 
363. See supra note 30. 
364. Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 351, at 2323. See also Lawrence, Reg­
ulating Racist Speech, supra note 360, at 472 (arguing that because society assigns this 
burden to subordinated groups "without seeking their advice, or consent," the practice 
amounts to "taxation without representation"). 
365. Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 351, at 2378. See also Frederick M. 
Lawrence, Enforcing Bias-Crime Laws Without Bias: Evaluating the Disproportionate­
Enforcement Critique, 66-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, (2003) [hereinafter Law­
rence, Enforcing Bias-Crime Laws] (describing how hate crimes harm not only individ­
ual victims but entire target communities). In addition to women, other historically 
targeted groups, such as racial minorities, would seem destined for degradation. Recall, 
for example, the anti-Muslim attacks perpetrated in the Commonwealth after Septem­
ber 11, 2001. See Hate Crime against Indian Students in Massachusetts, Dec. 26, 2002, at 
http://www.nriol.comlcontent/snippets/snippet848.html( describing the assault and bat­
tery of three students whose assailants beat them while "mentioning Osama bin Laden's 
name"); State by State breakdown ofAnti-Muslim Attacks, Sept. 22, 2001, at http://www. 
jannah.org/resources/muslimvictims.html (documenting the stabbing of a Boston Uni­
versity student). Should such violence reemerge in response to a future terrorist at­
tack-or in response to the threat of a future terrorist attack, see Greg Frost, Anti­
Muslim Rage in US Hurts Others Too, THE MANILA TIMES, July 23, 2003, at http://www. 
manilatimes.net/nationaIl2003/juIl23/opinionl2oo307230pi6.htmI (reporting on the at­
tack of a Hindu Indian pizza delivery man in New Bedford who had his jaw broken and 
lung pierced by young white men shouting "Go back to Iraq!"), Orientalist justification 
stories could erect yet another barrier which keeps "minorities from participating in the 
contemplation of public issues." Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 109 (Mari J. Matsuda et 
al. eds., Westview Press 1993). 
366. Ingber, supra note 25, at 31. See also Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra 
note 346, at 892 ("Free speech, like all marketplace activities, benefits those who are 
currently life's winners, reinforcing their advantage while enabling them to say to them­
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Of course, Snowden's primary purpose is not to persuade. If 
his objective was to expand the possible responses to an accusation 
he would not have written judges off as "people of violence,"367 but 
would have crafted his appeal in words these decision-makers could 
conceivably hear.368 
Displaying "astounding deftness," Snowden instead "reveal[ s] 
structure, de-construct [ s] and de-Iegitimate[s]. "369 He thus be­
comes one of the "super-termites" Matsuda once described, schol­
ars who "eat away at the trees of legal doctrine ... leaving sawdust 
in their paths."370 "That they do it so well, and so single-mindedly, 
is compelling," Matsuda concluded, "it suggests that this is what the 
smartest are doing. Never mind that no one knows what to do with 
selves that they won fair and square."); Bernard W. Bell, The Populism ofJustice Byron 
R. White: Media Cases and Beyond, 74 U. COL. L. REv. 1425, 1469 (2003) ("Speech may 
reflect and accentuate the inequalities in society. The powerful and the privileged may 
perhaps be heard more clearly in the marketplace of ideas not because of the cogency 
of their thought but because of the magnification of their voices by the very power and 
privileges they enjoy."); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 
GEORGIA L. REv. 803, 847 n.167 (1990) ("The guarantee of free speech benefits those 
who have the power to draw listeners: those with the greatest access to the market of 
ideas."). Consequently, some scholars now believe "social justice is no longer satisfied 
by an abstract right to speak one's mind, but rather demands conditions under which 
each person may fully exercise her or his intellectual and political agency." Patricia S. 
Mann, Hate Speech, Freedom, and Discourse Ethics in the Academy, in RADICAL PHI­
LOSOPHY OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO MAINSTREAM LEGAL THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 261 (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gould eds., Humanities Press 1995). 
See also Balkin, supra note 47, at 401 (calling "[e]ffective communication, or rather its 
substantive possibility ... an unavoidable component of the liberty of speech, just as 
effective bargaining, or its substantive possibility, is an essential component of eco­
nomic liberty"). For an examination of the results when the exercise of intellectual and 
political agency is denied, see Williams, supra note 45, at 1577 ("[W]hen the voices of 
those harmed by hate are systematically silenced, the opportunity to search for common 
ground and to move forward together is lost ...."). See also Lawrence, Regulating 
Racist Speech, supra note 360, at 468 ([Racism] "decreases the total amount of speech 
that enters the market by coercively silencing members of those groups who are its 
targets."); Martha Minow, Regulating Hatred: Whose Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose 
Power?-An Essay for Kenneth Karst, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1253, 1261 (2000) ("In the 
wake of biased speech, members of disadvantaged groups . . . may be heard only 
through the distorting lens of hate speech, with stereotypes about Asians or Hispanics 
or women or disabled persons, coloring the impression of the speaker's ideas."). 
367. Snowden, supra note 280, at 74 (quoting Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Nar­
rative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 53 (1982». 
368. Crenshaw, supra note 319, at 1367 ("People can only demand change in ways 
that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging. Demands for change 
that do not reflect the institutional logic-that is, demands that do not engage and sub­
sequently reinforce the dominant ideology-will probably be ineffective.") (citing 
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 73, at 22-25). 
369. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara­
tions, 22 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 323, 330 (1987). 
370. Id. 
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all the sawdust."371 
V. COUNTERING THE "CYCLOPS EFFECT"372 
If this Note is correct incontending that Hood and its progeny 
have compromised an important free speech objective, the question 
becomes whether the marketplace is better served by countenanc­
ing all competing harms claims or only those that do not impede 
access by others. Based on the foregoing outsider insights, this sec­
tion urges courts to adopt the latter approach and act, "not as a 
censor, but rather as a parliamentarian, requiring some to shut up 
so others can be heard. "373 
A. "Operationalizing the Insight"374 
Starting with Hood, Chief Justice Liacos wrote five separate 
times to express his concern "that evidence of necessity not be ex­
cluded by a motion in limine once a defendant has made a sufficient 
offer of proof."375 In these five opinions, it is clear that the Chief 
Justice's376 primary concern involved the respect he felt his fellow 
justices failed to afford the jury.377 Nevertheless, it seems equally 
371. Id. 
372. Judith Hicks Stiehm, The Military Ban on Homosexuals and the Cyclops 
Effect, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND CONTRASTS 
149-62 (Wilbur J. Scott & Sandra Carson Stanley eds., 1994). According to Stiehm: 
Social scientists have been painfully aware that the implementation of their 
well-thought-out-advice too often results in new (and unanticipated) 
problems. Sometimes this happens because the new policy has been based on 
a one-eyed vision. That is, the new policy is focused on what is known about 
one set of people, but then affects a larger set of people differently and 
sometimes adversely. That unfortunate, sometimes even monstrous, set of 
events is well-labeled the Cyclops effect. 
Id. at 149. 
373. Mann, supra note 366, at 261 (quoting Owen Fiss's explanation of "this shift­
ing locus of a democratic concern with speech rights"). 
374. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in 
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 386 (1991). 
375. Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Mass. 1993) (Liacos, c.J., con­
curring). See also Commonwealth v. Brogan, 612 N.E.2d 656, 661-62 (Mass. 1993) 
(Liacos, c.J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741, 745-47 (Mass. 
1991) (Liacos, c.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1383­
84 (Mass. 1991) (Liacos, c.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Commonwealth 
v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188, 197-98 (Mass. 1983) (Liacos, J., concurring). 
376. Justice Liacos became Chief Justice in 1989, three years after Hood. See 
John Ellement, Reflections from a Life in Court: Liacos Muses about Career, Retire­
ment, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1996, at Bl, available at 1996 WL 6866586. 
377. See, e.g., Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 747 (Liacos, C.J., dissenting) (describing 
the "vital functions of [the jury as] '[1] temper[ing] the application of strict rules of law 
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certain that he was aware of the benefits an alternative approach 
might bestow on the marketplace of ideas. In his Leno concur­
rence, for example, Chief Justice Liacos noted that "the over­
whelming and uncontroverted expert evidence presented at trial 
describing the effectiveness of needle exchange programs in curbing 
the spread of AIDS will, I hope, indicate to the Legislature the im­
portance of joining the vast majority of jurisdictions that have 
decriminalized possession and distribution of hypodermic 
syringes."378 
Integrating the approach to evidence of necessity favored by 
Chief Justice Liacos with the vision of the court as parliamentarian, 
this Note makes the following proposal: defendants who offer to 
prove each element of the Brugmann test deserve the chance to do 
so unless the crime for which they are charged involves the denigra­
tion of a natural person's379 standing.380 
This proposal presumes that while certain kinds of civil disobe­
dience-such as protests that disrupt traffic-might prove inconve­
nient for many, they do not assign a subordinate status to any 
individuals since dissidents do not target particular people and in­
fringe their typically protected rights.381 Thus, affording the neces­
sity defense to these sorts of disobedients would not jeopardize 
anyone's equal status by sanctioning the contravention of an indi­
vidual's legitimate interests.382 However, other acts of civil 
disobedience, 
by bringing the common sense judgment of a group of laymen to the case [and] ... [2] 
stand[ing] as a check on arbitrary enforcement of the law' "). 
378. Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 457 (Liacos, c.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
379. This formulation is intended to exclude from protection the corporate per­
son. For a recent call to overturn Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 
118 U.S. 394 (1886), and end this indefensible legal fiction, see William Quigley, Catho­
lic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large Corporations: Time to Abolish Corporate 
Person Hood, 5 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 109 (2004) (arguing that the "legal DNA" of 
large corporations "prevents them from acting like humans and having the chance to 
act in moral ways"). 
380. Schopp, supra note 361, at 2096. Because the focus here is the marketplace 
of ideas, this proposal does not address the question of how compelling evidence of 
necessity must be in order to merit a jury instruction on the defense. That being said, 
the approach favored by Justice Greaney in O'Malley seems quite reasonable. See 
Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 439 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (If, after all the 
evidence has been introduced, "the defendant has failed to produce some evidence on 
each element of the defense, the judge should decline to instruct on it. In that event, 
the judge may, if appropriate, give curative instructions to caution the jury against con­
sidering evidence not properly before them.") (citation omitted). 
381. Schopp, supra note 361, at 2105. 
382. Id. 
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such as those involving trespass to private property or interfer­
ence with the exercise of individual rights, directly violate the 
standing of identified individuals. When the offense charged 
constitutes a violation of the rights of an identified victim, [mak­
ing the necessity defense available] nullification denigrates the 
standing of that victim by withholding condemnation of that vio­
lation and by acquiescing in the defendant's imputation of lesser 
standing to that person.383 
Only by preventing competing harms claims under these cir­
cumstances can courts effectively fulfill their obligation to safe­
guard the standing of vulnerable citizens and protect the possibility 
that their speech might be heard.384 
1. Implications for Crowe 
Unlike the defendants in Hood who, Justice Liacos deter­
mined, offered to prove neither the absence of legal alternatives 
nor legislative preclusion, the Crowe defendants "allege[ d] that 
they would introduce sufficient evidence on each element of the 
defense to generate a jury question."385 Accordingly, they would 
satisfy the first prong of this Note's proposed test. 
In contrast to the defendant in Brogan who, over the course of 
a five month period "trespassed and obstructed activities" at three 
separate abortion clinics (thereby disregarding a court order),386 
the Crowe defendants' arguably inconvenient act did not violate an­
yone's civil rights.387 Hence, they would satisfy the second prong 
and be entitled to assert a competing harms claim. 
2. Implications for Other Civil Disobedients 
Suppose that in the wake of Goodridge v. Department of Pub­
lic Health,388 two groups, each committed to protecting the tradi­
383. !d. 
384. Id. at 2106. For an examination of how subordinated communities are si­
lenced, see CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW 39 (Harvard University Press, 1987) ("[W]hen you are powerless, you don't 
just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak .... Not being heard is not just a function 
of lack of recognition ... it is also silence of the deep kind, the silence of being pre­
vented from having anything to say."). 
385. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 198. For a detailed discussion of what the Crowe de­
fendants offered to prove, see supra notes 256-75 and accompanying text. 
386. Commonwealth v. Brogan, 612 N.E.2d 656, 657 (Mass. 1993). 
387. Id. at 660. 
388. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) ("[T]he Commonwealth may [not] deny 
the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals 
of the same sex who wish to marry."). 
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tional conception of marriage, decide to engage in civil 
disobedience. Incensed most of all by the actions of un-elected "ac­
tivist judges,"389 Group One chooses to stage a sit-in outside the 
chambers of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Several 
days after their arrest, Group Two decides to take the battle to the 
"sinners"39o themselves and illegally occupies a church on the 
morning of a well-publicized same-sex wedding.391 
Prior to their trials, the Commonwealth files identical motions 
in limine asking the courts to bar evidence of necessity. In re­
sponse, each group offers to prove that: (1) the impending same-sex 
marriages constituted a clear and imminent danger to the very 
fabric of society; (2) by acting as they did the defendants had a rea­
sonable belief that such marriages might be averted; (3) individually 
and collectively, they had written letters to editors, lobbied elected 
officials, attended marches, and participated in vigils, thereby ex­
hausting all legal alternatives; and (4) the Legislature had not acted 
to preclude the necessity defense. 
Like the Crowe defendants, Groups One and Two would each 
satisfy the first prong of the proposed test.392 However, given the 
loss of standing suffered by the same-sex couple at the hands of 
389. See, e.g., Jessica E. Vascellaro, New Campaign Ads to Target Judges, From 
the Left and the Right Bush Nominees Come Under Fire, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 
2004, at A15, available at 2004 WL 59797174 (citing C. Boyden Gray, chairman of the 
Committee for Justice, and his "call for the end of 'activist' judges"). 
390. See, e.g., Rick Klein, Marriage Measure a Shaky Solution, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 14,2004, at AI, available at 2004 WL 59776672 ("Opponents [of gay mar­
riage] shook signs declaring homosexuality a sin, with some shouldering wooden cruci­
fixes around Beacon Hill."). 
391. Ironically, such action would subject Group Two members to the serious 
penalties found in "The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994," 18 
U.S.C.A. 	§ 248 (West. 1995). According to Professor Bruce Ledewitz, 
Originally, the Clinic Act provisions were limited to abortion clinics. In Con­
ference Committee, section (a)(2) was added, subjecting to the same penalties 
anyone who "by physical obstruction ... interferes with or attempts to ... 
interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First 
Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship." This 
added section was plainly aimed at appearing politically "even-handed." Now 
the group "Act Up," for example, will be subject to federal jurisdiction and 
sanctions for disrupting church services. 
Ledewitz, American Sit-in, supra note 88, at 566. 
392. The fact that Group One's protest was more akin to the informational vari­
ety found in Hood and Averill would be irrelevant to Chief Justice Liacos. See Hood, 
452 N.E.2d at 198 (suggesting that the defendants satisfied the second element of the 
defense by offering to prove that "their actions reasonably could be expected to be 
effective"). 
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Group Two, only Group One would satisfy the second prong and be 
entitled to present a necessity defense. 
Lest readers conclude this proposed test is hopelessly ideologi­
cal,393 let us conclude this section by examining how the courts 
might respond to the civil disobedience of two hypothetical groups 
on the other side of the marriage equality debate. 
Suppose that in response to the Legislature's efforts to write 
discrimination into the state Constitution, Group Three stages a sit­
in during the summer 2005 Constitutional Convention. Shortly 
thereafter, Group Four encircles the home of a religious leader in­
hospitable to their cause and prevents him from presiding at a Sun­
day morning service.394 Once again, the Commonwealth files 
identical motions in limine asking the courts to bar evidence of ne­
cessity. And once again, Groups Three and Four each offer to 
prove that: (1) the impending discriminatory actions constituted 
clear and imminent dangers to the health, safety and well-being of 
members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender community; 
(2) by acting as they did the defendants had a reasonable belief that 
state-sanctioned heterosexism might be averted; (3) individually 
and collectively, they had written letters to editors, lobbied elected 
officials, attended marches, and participated in vigils, thereby ex­
hausting all legal alternatives; and (4) the Legislature had not acted 
to preclude the necessity defense. 
Like their philosophical adversaries in Groups One and Two, 
members of Groups Three and Four would satisfy the first prong of 
the test. And like Group Two members, Group Four activists 
would be barred from asserting a necessity defense based on their 
interference with an ascertainable victim's constitutional rights. 
As for Group Three, a heterosexual couple could conceivably 
seek to keep these civil disobedients from asserting a necessity de­
fense by claiming that their act undermined the traditional concep­
tion of marriage, thereby denigrating the couple's standing.395 
393. Compare THIONG'O, supra note 317, at 126 (defining ideology as "the whole 
system of symbols, images, beliefs, feelings, thoughts, and attitudes by which we explain 
the world and our place in it") with Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War ofWords: Critical Race 
Theory and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE 
SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 17, 35 (1994) [hereinafter SPEAKING OF 
RACE] (repeating the "old joke" that an "ideology" is "somebody else's politics"). 
394. See supra note 391. 
395. One suspects such a couple's amicus brief would rely heavily on the work of 
Hoover Institution fellow, Stanley Kurtz, who claims that gay marriage is having a dele­
terious impact on heterosexual marriage in Scandinavia. Stanley Kurtz, The End of 
Marriage in Scandinavia: The "Conservative Case" For Same-Sex Marriage Collapses, 
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However, given the judiciary's steadfast refusal to confer victim sta­
tus on "offended" heterosexuals,396 there seems little chance of 
such a claim's success.397 
3. Implications for the Marketplace of Ideas 
To predict this proposal's impact on the marketplace requires a 
preliminary assessment of its present state. According to Nicholas 
Johnson, former Commissioner at the Federal Communications 
Commission, 
self-governing societies [are shaped] by their ideas and informa­
tion. Rather than rely on folk music, stories, and a true market­
place of the people's ideas, we have turned this public 
responsibility over to commerce. And commerce naturally 
selects those ... ideas, and information that will provide the best 
media environment for commercials .... By offering the ideas of 
the marketplace rather than a marketplace of ideas, we are, in 
effect, rotting our seed corn.398 
Johnson is not alone in this appraisal. Instead of providing for 
"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources,"399 Professor Ingber believes the present mar­
ketplace "encourages the presentation of a limited range of 
preselected ideas."4oo This deviation from "the open-minded evalu­
ation [the marketplace] purports to foster"401 is, in Professor 
Ingber's opinion, a corollary of the authority increasingly entrusted 
THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, available at http://www.weeklystandard.coml 
ContentlPublic/Articles/000/OOO/003/660zypwj.asp. But see Rona Marech, Publicity-Shy 
Critic at Center of Storm: Researcher Wrote Much-Cited Article on Registered Partner­
ships, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2004, at Al (citing a non-partisan study which found 
"[h]eterosexual marriage rates in Denmark actually increased after adoption of same­
sex marriage"). 
396. William B. Rubenstein, Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route 
to Equality? Some Reflections on the Construction of the "Hate Speech" Debate from a 
Lesbian/Gay Perspective, in SPEAKING OF RACE, supra note 393, at 286 (citing "a whole 
line of cases that traces the formation of lesbian and gay student groups on college 
campuses" and the courts' rejection of the recurring argument that gay meetings "of­
fended" heterosexual students). 
397. Id. 
398. Nicholas Johnson, Forty Years of Wandering in the Wasteland, 55 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 521, 527 (2003). 
399. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
400. Ingber, supra note 25, at 31. According to Noam Chomsky, "what are called 
opinions 'on the left' and 'on the right' in the media represent only a limited spectrum 
of debate, which reflects the range of needs of private power-but there's essentially 
nothing beyond those 'acceptable' positions." CHOMSKY, supra note 87, at 13. 
401. Ingber, supra note 25, at 31. 
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to a vast bureaucracy that makes "the government, rather than indi­
vidual citizens, the most pervasIve participant In the 
marketplace."402 
One recent example of this phenomenon was the media cover­
age preceding the Iraq war. On August 12, 2004, the Washington 
Post published a front-page story exploring the newspaper's treat­
ment of anti-war activists before the U.S. invasion.403 "Across the 
country, the voices raising questions about the war were lonely 
ones," said Executive Editor Leonard Downie, Jr. "We didn't pay 
enough attention to the minority."404 Putting aside the dubious 
contention that those who opposed pre-emptive war constituted a 
"minority,"405 the Post's startling admission that it serves "basically 
[as] a mouthpiece for whatever administration is in power"406 goes 
to the heart of Johnson and Ingber's argument.407 So, too, does the 
study conducted by Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 
which analyzed two weeks of pre-war coverage and "the 393 on­
camera sources who appeared in nightly news stories about Iraq on 
ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News 
402. Id. at 37. 
403. DEMOCRACY Now!, Washington Post Admits It Buried Anti-War Voices 
Before the Iraq Invasion, Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.democracynow.orglarticle.pl?sid=4/ 
08/1311413248&mode=thread&tid=2S. 
404. Id. (quoting Leonard Downie, Jr.). 
4OS. "Are we really talking about the minority?" Amy Goodman asked. "If you 
look at the polls leading up to the invasion of Iraq, more than half of the people in this 
country were opposed to war [as opposed to] more inspections, and more diplomacy." 
Id. 
406. Id. (quoting Karen D. Young, a Reporter and former Assistant Managing 
Editor). See also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 42 (1970) ("The mass 
media--essentially the voice of the Establishment-much of the time reflects the mood 
of the Pentagon and the causes which the military-industrial complex espouses."); Rich­
ard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
778, 781-82 (2000) ("[B]ecause reporters depend on the establishment for information, 
while the networks depend on corporate advertisers for profits, this industry is unlikely 
to be a source of dissent."). 
407. According to one commentator, "After the September 11 attack on the 
World Trade Center, the U.S. mainstream media's blatant performance as the govern­
ment's mouthpiece was the butt of some pretty black humor in the rest of the world." 
Arundhati Roy, Peace is War: The Collateral Damage of Breaking News, Address 
Before the Sarai "CrisislMedia" Workshop (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.sarai. 
netljournaV04_pdfl02arundhati.pdf. In light of recent revelations regarding the Bush 
administration's pervasive use of "government-produced news reports," one suspects 
the jokes haven't stopped. See David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, a New Age 
of Prepackaged Television News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2OOS, available at http://www. 
truthout.orgldocs_200S/03130SZ.shtml (noting that these video news releases "often 
feature 'interviews' with senior administration officials in which questions are scripted 
and answers rehearsed"). 
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and PBS's NewsHour with Jim Lehrer."408 Whereas over half the 
guests "were either current or former [U.S.] government or military 
officials,"409 FAIR found that less than one percent "were identi­
fied with organized protests or anti-war groups."410 
How, then, would the acceptance of this Note's recommenda­
tion impact the marketplace of ideas? By making the necessity de­
fense available to those capable of satisfying the proposed two­
prong test, courts would permit defendants like Frances Crowe to 
bring to the public a broader range of viewpoints.411 
Consider, for example, the press coverage of two Common­
wealth cases in which trial courts took seriously Hood's admonition 
against the preclusion of potential defense evidence. 
On November 24, 1986, when demonstrators occupied an ad­
ministration building at the University of Massachusetts in Am­
herst, readers of the next day's newspapers learned that those 
arrested were protesting the University's policy of permitting the 
CIA to recruit on campus.412 However, it was not until the trial 
began and the defendants asserted a necessity defense that readers 
learned why the protestors found the CIA's presence so appal­
ling.413 Writing for the Boston Globe, reporter Jonathan Kaufman 
summarized the testimony of Edgar Chamorro, a former Contra 
leader, who "described how he translated into Spanish a CIA man­
ual the agency gave him that advocated the assassination of judges 
and others to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. "414 Kaufman 
408. FAIRNESS & ACCURACY IN REpORTING, In Iraq Crisis, Networks Are Mega­




411. See Tierney, supra note 247, at 978 ("An act of civil disobedience probably 
cannot, by itself, effect the desired change. But it exposes the need for change and 
promotes public debate and citizen participation in the law and policy making 
processes."). But see CHOMSKY, supra note 87, at 3. According to Professor Chomsky, 
viewpoints such as Crowe's would still be subject to "a complex system of filters in the 
media . . . which end[] up ensuring that dissident perspectives are weeded out, or 
marginalized in one way or another." Id. See also BERTRAND RUSSELL, POLmCAL IDE· 
ALS 16 (1980) ("[O]nly an accident can enable the point of view or the interests of those 
who are not wealthy to find expression in a newspaper."). 
412. Associated Press, Amy Carter and Abbie Hoffman Among 59 Arrested at 
UMASS Protest, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1986, at B19. 
413. See Jonathan Kaufman, Defense Cites CIA Past in Carter, Hoffman Trial, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1987, at 72, available at 1987 WL 3972303 [hereinafter 
Defense Cites CIA Past] (repeating the defense's assertion that the trial constituted "the 
most thorough examination of CIA activities" since the Church hearings). 
414. Jonathan Kaufman, Ellsberg Backs Actions of CIA Protestors in Carter, 
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also gave Globe readers access to exchanges like the following one 
between defense attorney Leonard Weinglass and former CIA op­
erative Ralph McGehee: 
Q. (by Weinglass): Did you ever belong to a program of assas­
sination and kidnapping run by the CIA? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the name of that program? 
A. Operation Phoenix which took place in Vietnam ... 20,000 
people were killed in that program.415 
When the trial culminated with the defendants' acquittal, the 
Globe concluded its coverage by printing an excerpt of an interview 
with a juror who said she was "shocked" by the CIA's conduct and 
"kind of proud of the [protestors]."416 
Of course, it is unlikely future necessity defenses would garner 
such extensive media treatment. Among those tried for their parts 
in the CIA protest were a renowned 1960s activist and the daughter 
of a former President.417 It isn't every day that such well-known 
figures put their bodies on the line,418 and the wide interest their 
trial drew419 was surely due, at least in part, to the defendants' ce­
lebrity status. That being said, the Globe's coverage of a more re­
cent competing harms claim suggests the efficacy of this Note's 
proposed recommendation does not depend on the identity of the 
claimants. 
On March 11, 1999, Globe correspondent, Sacha Pfeiffer, re­
ported on the trial of the "Raytheon peacemakers," eleven activists 
who conducted an unauthorized "citizen weapon inspection" at a 
missile plant in Andover, Massachusetts.42o Permitted to assert a 
choice of evils defense, the protestors argued that their admittedly 
illegal conduct was necessary to identify and eliminate weapons of 
mass destruction.421 "There is no experience like seeing a child die 
Hoffman Trial, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1987, at B20, available at 1987 WL 
3972423. 
415. Defense Cites CIA Past, supra note 413. 
416. Jonathan Kaufman, Verdict in CIA Protest Trial Draws Praise, Fire Lawyers 
Predict 'Necessity Defense' Will Become More Commonplace, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 17, 1987, at B19, available at 1987 WL 3973220. 
417. Associated Press, supra note 412 (reporting on arrest of Abbie Hoffman and 
Amy Carter). 
418. William Moffitt, Race and the Criminal Justice System, 36 GONZ. L. REv. 
305, 313 (2000). 
419. See Defense Cites CIA Past, supra note 413. 
420. See Pfeiffer, supra note 297. 
421. Id. 
2005] THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 361 

and knowing your country had a hand in that," said defendant Scott 
Schaeffer-Duffy. "It motivates you to do everything your con­
science and imagination and intellect can let you do to try to stop 
it."422 
Although such testimony failed to persuade the jury,423 what 
Pfeiffer described as "eloquent pleas of innocence in the name of 
peace and social change"424 did "dramatize [an] evil[] of our soci­
ety"425 by forcing the Commonwealth to express its own conception 
of competing harms. "Necessity is something real," said Assistant 
District Attorney Murat Erkan, "something looking you in the eye, 
something that is a danger to you, your children, and your commu­
nity, not people thousands of miles away."426 Compelled by the ne­
cessity defense to admit that it predicates human concern upon 
geographic proximity, the state made clear a position it rarely in­
jects into the marketplace of ideas.427 
CONCLUSION 
Beneath the surface of Crowe-like outcomes, many commenta­
tors insist, lies the judicial fear "that allowing the necessity defense 
will result in the collapse of the criminallaw."428 Because the ne­
cessity doctrine makes possible the "ad hoc acquittal ... of defend­
ants who have committed acts prohibited by criminal statutes," 
courts perceive it as a threat to "the state's power to regulate and 
punish undesirable behavior."429 Such apprehension, to the extent 
422. Id. 
423. The defendants were convicted of trespassing and sentenced to "one year of 
unsupervised probation as well as a $35 'victim-witness fee' or seven hours of commu­
nity service." [d. 
424. Id. 
425. KING, supra note 65, at 58 (describing how nonviolence seeks to bring to 
light injustice "in such a way that pressure is brought to bear against those evils by the 
forces of good will in the community and change is produced"). 
426. Pfeiffer, supra note 297. 
427. See, e.g., Robert Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST., Sept. 
20,2001, at A6. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, human concern for peo­
ple thousands of miles away is "at the heart of America's ... development agenda." Id. 
("Free trade agreements can help establish the basic building blocks for sustainable 
development, including private property rights, competition [and] the rule of law. Most 
importantly, free trade is about freedom and open societies."). 
428. Levitin, supra note 247, at 1251. See also Commonwealth's Motion, supra 
note 15 (claiming that to permit "the defendants to break the law attempting to subvert 
this expression of national political will is to invite chaos"). 
429. John T. Parry, The Virtue ofNecessity: Reshaping CUlpability and the Rule of 
Law, 36 Hous. L. REV. 397, 398 (1997). 
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that it is genuine,430 is not entirely unfounded. After all, "when the 
necessity defense is actually submitted to the trier of fact ... de­
fendants have usually been acquitted. "431 
That being said, even if courts relaxed necessity requirements 
beyond what this Note advocates, formidable deterrents to criminal 
conduct would still remain.432 For starters, criminal proceedings are 
expensive and time-consuming affairs.433 Few people have the req­
uisite resources, not to mention the inclination, "to submit volunta­
rily to the costs, pressures, and demands of arrest and trial, and risk 
rejection of the necessity defense and a possible ... conviction."434 
While relaxed necessity requirements might inspire a few unlawful 
acts which would not otherwise occur,435 "powerful psychological 
and sociological factors ... [would continue to] compel most people 
to quietly conform."436 Indeed, for those concerned with the sur­
vival of democratic institutions, the reality of widespread apathy437 
represents a far graver threat than the possibility of increased civil 
disobedience.438 
430. But see Lippman, International Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra 
note 50, at 55 (calling it "ingenuous to argue that judicial relaxation of the necessity 
defense ... will lead to anarchy"); Quigley, supra note 5, at 54-56 (suggesting judges 
contrive slippery slopes to "anarchy, chaos, pillage, plunder and robbery" to maintain 
institutional power); Rachael E. Schwartz, Chaos, Oppression, and Rebellion: The Use 
of Self-Help to Secure Individual Rights Under International Law, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 
255,299 (1994) ("The notion that a single violation of a norm will bring down the entire 
system seems to be animated by the primitive notion that the infraction of sacred rites 
by even a mild deviation will anger the gods who will let loose the gravest conse­
quences."); RAWLS, supra note 322, at 383 (calling "civil disobedience ... one of the 
stabilizing devices of a constitutional system"). 
431. Quigley, supra note 5, at 54 (citation omitted). 
432. Levitin, supra note 247, at 1252. 
433. Id. 
434. Lippman, International Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra note 50, at 
55. 
435. Levitin, supra note 247, at 1252. 
436. Lippman, International Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra note 50, at 
55 n.391 (citing R. Lance Shotland & Lynne L. Goodstein, The Role of Bystanders in 
Crime Control, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9 (1984». 
437. Johnson, supra note 398, at 525 ("Levels of voter participation range be­
tween five and fifty percent in everything from school board to presidential elections."). 
See also Lippman, International Law Versus the American Judiciary, supra note 50, at 55 
(discussing the "ideological indoctrination and psychic numbing which helps to account 
for societal indifference"). 
438. If democracy requires an informed citizenry to function effectively, see 
Ingber, supra note 25, at 3-4, then widespread societal ignorance is every bit as danger­
ous as apathy. See Johnson, supra note 398, at 526 n.9 (reporting the results of a recent 
survey that found that "[o]nly fourteen percent of those of potential draft age could find 
Iraq [on a map], a country where they may be sent into battle"); Eric Alterman, Faith­
based Journalism: The Refs Work Themselves, THE NATION, Nov. 15,2004, at 11 (citing 
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To maintain (or achieve) legitimacy, the marketplace of ideas 
must make room for presently excluded perspectives.439 By al­
lowing certain civil disobedients the opportunity to assert necessity 
defenses, Commonwealth courts could participate in this important 
endeavor. After analyzing the market-opening proposals of others, 
this Note has settled upon an approach somewhere between what 
former Chief Justice Liacos advocated and what the Hood majority 
held. For those most concerned with safeguarding civil rights, this 
proposal may prove unsatisfactory. While the second prong does 
attempt to "encourage the right kind of listening," it does not privi­
lege "the previously silenced."440 More disturbing, perhaps, are the 
loopholes that could permit in-court efforts to justify existing power 
disparities.441 
For those most passionate about protecting the freedom of ex­
pression, the second prong might prove equally upsetting. Distrust­
ful of "giving the state the power to determine what people can 
say,"442 free speech advocates could claim this Note fails to meet 
the burden of proof required of any proposed exercise of such 
a recent study by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Atti­
tudes) ("A mere 31 percent of Bush supporters are aware that most of the world contin­
ues to oppose the US invasion of Iraq, with 42 percent assuming an evenly divided 
global opinion and more than a quarter believing that the rest of the planet approves."). 
439. See John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and 
Equality, 85 Ky. L.J. 9, 72 (1997) ("If value and truth claims are to have any legitimacy, 
participation must be open to all as equals and uncoerced."). 
440. Cain, supra note 366, at 844. In search of "legal tools that have progressive 
effect, defying the habit of neutral principles to entrench existing power," outsiders and 
their allies have advocated for speech laws that distinguish between minority- and ma­
jority-group speakers. Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 351, at 2325, 2358. See also 
Chris Demaske, Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate Speech, 9 
COMM. L. POL'y 273, 280-83 (2004). Notwithstanding the dangers of "the neutrality 
trap," id. at 2374 (discussing how an anti-mask statute designed to combat the Ku Klux 
Klan was used to prosecute "Iranian students wearing masks [for symbolic and safety 
reasons while] opposing human rights violations by the Shah of Iran ..."), this Note 
proceeds mindful of the fact that there is "[n]ot a single bias-crime law in the United 
States [which] distinguishes between minority and majority victims for purposes of es­
tablishing the elements of the crime." Lawrence, Enforcing Bias-Crime Laws, supra 
note 365, at 67. 
441. But see Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 185 
(2002). Professor Ruskola suggests that the "marvelous efficiency" of prejudice is such 
that it simply cannot be kept from the courtroom (or anywhere else). Id. Citing an 
observation of David Halperin, he explains, "'if the message is already waiting at the 
receiver's end, it doesn't even need to be sent; it just needs to be activated.'" Id. (quot­
ing DAVID M. HALPERIN, ST. FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 13 (1995)). 
442. CHOMSKY, supra note 87, at 273. See also Ansley, supra note 344, at IV.D.6 
(discussing "The Problem of Dependence on Authority"). 
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authority.443 
These criticisms notwithstanding, there are reasons to believe 
that what this Note proposes might find support within each camp. 
While traditional civil libertarians concede that "the [F]irst 
[A]mendment should not necessarily protect targeted individual 
harassment just because it happens to use the vehicle of speech,"444 
egalitarians are wary of the dangers of censorship445 and advocate 
tolerance for those words which are merely offensive.446 
Of course, the inherent tension between the First and Four­
teenth Amendments-between freedom and equality-remains un­
resolved. By confronting this tension along what has been called 
the "fault line of progressive politics,"447 this Note has sought not to 
conclude a conversation but continue one.448 It has done so mind­
ful of the notion that "[t]ension and conflict are not alien nor ab­
normal to growth but are the natural results of the process of 
changes."449 
Luke Shulman-Ryan * 
443. CHOMSKY, supra note 87, at 201. 
444. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 498 (1990). 
445. See Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 351, at 2357 ("The image of book 
burnings should unnerve us and remind us to argue long and hard before selecting a 
class of speech to exclude from the public domain."). 
446. For an enlightening discussion on "the great difference between offense and 
injury," see Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 360, at 461. Professor Law­
rence distinguishes 
between the offensiveness of words that you would rather not hear-because 
they are labeled dirty, impolite, or personally demeaning-and the injury in­
flicted by words that remind the world you are fair game for physical attack, 
evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons regarding your inferiority 
that you have so painstakingly repressed, and imprint upon you a badge of 
servitude and subservience for all the world to see. 
Id. 
447. Michael A. Olivas, "Breaking the Law" on Principle: An Essay on Lawyers' 
Dilemmas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 815, 856 (1991) 
(citing an observation of Richard Delgado). 
448. Like Professor Powell, 
I hope ... that this [Note] will advance the dialogue concerning the tension 
between free speech and equality. Indeed, if I am right, the problem will not 
be solved in closed or abstract logic, but must be addressed in an open, dialogi­
cal process. These questions must remain open for present and future partici­
pants to examine. In others words, I do not intend for the approach I 
advocate to be a conversation-ending strategy. 
Powell, supra note 439, at 92. 
449. KING, supra note 65, at 98. 
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